MEMORANDUM TO THE MINISTER

FOLLOW-UP TO PORTFOLIO BRIEFING ON IMPROVING GOVERNMENT ASSISTED REFUGEE OUTCOMES

FOR INFORMATION

SUMMARY

- This note responds to questions you raised during the portfolio briefing of August 29, 2012, about improving the settlement outcomes of resettled refugees.

- Annexes A&B respectively provide a summary of the resettlement landscape according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and refugee conflicts in the Horn of Africa region. Annex C is a Departmental Community Backgrounder on Somali Canadians. Annexes, D and E are external studies that provide analysis of factors leading to the settlement outcomes for the 1990s cohort of Somali asylum claimants in Canada, as well as second generation Somali.

- Annexes F, G and H provide information on specific refugee groups and categories (government assisted, privately sponsored and in-Canada asylum claimants) by country of birth (Afghanistan, Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan).

- The Department will be seeking your approval later in the fall on which refugee populations should be the focus of Canadian resettlement efforts in 2013 and beyond, as well as on options for reducing the number of high medical needs cases being referred to Canada for resettlement.

BACKGROUND:

- During the Portfolio briefing on August 29, 2012, you requested a summary of UNHCR's views on resettlement and how it determines which populations to prioritize. You also requested further information about the refugees being referred for resettlement by the UNHCR out of the Horn of Africa.

- The Department was also asked to provide academic papers related to the settlement outcomes of the Somali refugee cohort that arrived during the 1990s, as well as data on other refugee cohorts, disaggregated by country of birth.

- This information is intended to help inform decision-making on whether Canada should respond to UNHCR's appeals for more resettlement out of the Horn of Africa.

Canada

CURRENT STATUS:

- Attached are eight annexes responding to the request.
  - o Annex A provides a summary of the UNHCR's resettlement activity.
  - o Annex B provides a brief summary of various conflicts in the Horn of Africa.
  - o Annex C is a backgrounder on Somalis in Canada.
  - o Annex D is an academic paper entitled *Integrating Young Canadians of Minority Backgrounds into Mainstream Canadian Society: the Case of Somali Youth.*
  - o Annex E is an academic paper entitled, *"Cashberta:" Migration Experiences of Somali-Canadian Second Generation Youth in Canada.*
  - o Annex F contains an analysis of economic outcomes for government-assisted refugees (GARs).
  - o Annex G contains an analysis of economic outcomes for privately sponsored refugees (PSRs).
  - o Annex H contains an analysis of economic outcomes for landed in Canada refugees (LCRs).

- The vast majority of Somali nationals arriving in Canada during the 1980s and early 1990s were refugee claimants who gained border access via the United States (U.S.), with some also transiting through Europe. Many came via the U.S. because the Americans facilitated indirect travel for Somalis usually on the strength of forged Canadian documents. Additionally, beginning in the mid 1980s, Somalis who had been sent by their government to study in the U.S., began claiming refugee status in Canada.

- During the same period, a small number of Somalis (an average of two to three a year) were sponsored by World University Services of Canada (WUSC) under the PSR program while others were admitted under the family class stream. The number of GARs coming from Somalia has remained fairly low throughout the entire period examined. GARs from Somalia made up only 2% of total GAR landings from 1993-2001 and 4% from 2002-2009.

- In 1993, the *Immigration Act* was amended such that undocumented asylum seekers who were found to be refugees were not able to immediately apply for permanent resident status. Many Somali refugees in Canada were impacted by this change and the article in Annex D describes some of the challenges that Somalis, who arrived during the 1990s, experienced while trying to integrate in Canada. The academic paper found in Annex E, provides a more detailed analysis of the socio-economic outcomes for Somalis in Canada, including for second generation Somalis, as compared to the general population.

- Annexes F, G and H respectively provide more information about Somali outcomes when compared to other refugee groups. To provide a sense of the prevailing trends with respect to economic outcomes, detailed analyses were done on some of the recent top source countries for GARs. The analysis provided in Annex F is focused on GARs from Afghanistan, Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan. Annex G and H then break down the same outcomes for PSRs and in-Canada landed refugees from the same source countries.

- One of the most surprising findings of the cross-country comparisons is the outcomes for Somalis who arrived after the enactment of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* in 2002. While average employment earnings for Somalis were well below those of the rest of the GAR population during the pre-IRPA period, the post-IRPA cohorts of Somalis report average employment earnings well above that of the rest of the GAR population. This same trend is noted with PSRs from Somalia.

NEXT STEPS:

- A decision memo will follow later this month on which populations could be the focus of Canadian resettlement efforts. Options regarding how to reduce the number of high medical needs cases will also be brought forward later in the fall.

Neil Yeates

Attachments (8):
Annex A: UNHCR and Resettlement: A summary
Annex B: Conflicts in the Horn of African
Annex C: Community Backgrounder: Somali Canadians
Annex D: Metropolis Report – Somali Youth Conversation
Annex E: Migration Experiences of Somali-Canadian Second Generation in Canada
Annex F: GARs by COB (Government assisted refugees by country of birth)
Annex G: PSRs by COB (Privately sponsored refugees by country of birth)
Annex H: LCRs by COB (Landed in-Canada refugees by country of birth)

Annex A: UNHCR and Resettlement

Issue: A description of the UNHCR's mandate as regards resettlement and its views on resettlement including how it determines which populations should be the focus of priority efforts.

Sources: *2013 UNHCR Global Resettlement Needs* (July 2012). This is a restricted distribution to resettlement states given sensitivities of refugee host countries. *Resettlement Handbook* (July 2011). This is the UNHCR operational field manual.

BACKGROUND:

Resettlement within UNHCR's mandate
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established on 1 January 1951 by UN General Assembly Resolution 319 (IV). UNHCR's mandate is to provide international protection to refugees and other persons of concern to the Office and – as a consequence – to seek permanent or durable solutions to their problem.

There are three commonly accepted durable solutions for refugees: a safe return to the country of origin, permission to stay in the country of asylum with rights similar to nationals (local integration) or resettlement to a third country where rights similar to nationals are granted.

The two functions, international protection and the identification of durable solutions, can be considered UNHCR's core objectives, although its mandate has been expanded through subsequent UN General Assembly Resolutions. Resettlement plays a vital role in achieving both of these objectives.

Operational coordination
Key priorities in the context of UNHCR's capacity to identify and refer persons for resettlement consideration by States are the focus on multi-year planning, using resettlement in tandem with repatriation or local integration to secure comprehensive solutions strategies for a given population, and improving how it identifies the refugees within a larger group that are most in need of resettlement.

The Working Group on Resettlement (WGR) and the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR) process is the primary vehicle for collaborative efforts between UNHCR, governments, NGOs, and international organizations to enhance the use of resettlement, identify and address challenges, and shape joint strategies and directions for the future. The UNHCR serves as the Secretariat for the WGR and the ATCR, while the chairmanship rotates among the government members of resettlement States. An NGO focal point is traditionally drawn from the same State as the current Chair. Canada through CIC, just took on the chair for 2012/2013.

Resettlement cannot be viewed in isolation from other protection interventions or from the domestic environment of the country of asylum. UNHCR offices incorporate resettlement activities into their overall humanitarian assistance and protection and durable solutions strategies for the refugee populations in a given country.

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Evolving Global Framework

To respond to new realities in the refugee context, to react to large-scale protracted refugee situations and revitalize the international protection regime, the UNHCR launched the Global Consultations on International Protection in 2000. These consultations led to the Agenda for Protection which sets out goals and concrete steps for states to redouble their refugee protection efforts and find solutions for more refugees. Resettlement is addressed in goal five of the Agenda for Protection, which calls on States to increase their resettlement numbers, diversify the kinds of refugee groups they welcome, and introduce more flexible resettlement criteria in an effort to secure more durable solutions, particularly for protracted refugee situations. These consultations initiated, inter alia, a discussion on how the international community could use resettlement more strategically in order to benefit more refugees.

In 2003, the international community defined a strategic use of resettlement as one where resettlement activity 'leads to planned direct and indirect benefits accruing to refugees not being resettled'. For example, a strategic use of resettlement can help sustain access to asylum in the face of a continued refugee flow; it can also play a role in providing access to more services for the general refugee population. Ideally, a strategic use of resettlement would also help lead to comprehensive solutions for specific refugee populations involving all three durable solutions. With this in mind, the international community (led by Canada and UNHCR), drafted and agreed to the Multilateral Framework of Understandings for Resettlement (MFU) in 2004.[1] This was an important development for advancing the concept of the strategic use of resettlement and in encouraging resettlement countries to pursue resettlement arrangements that would promote and be part of comprehensive solutions to particular refugee situations.

These developments in the international policy context underscored the fact that resettlement could not operate in isolation from the other durable solutions and emphasized a need for more strategic and coordinated engagement on the part of resettlement countries to ensure they were part of a wider solution to the refugee dilemma. It was acknowledged that beyond the important role that resettlement can play in helping one family or one individual, resettlement, when pursued in a strategic fashion and in line with the MFU, could have wider positive implications. Further, it was widely agreed that resettlement countries could most effectively help to share the burden of refugee hosting countries, by targeting more vulnerable segments of the refugee population in order to alleviate some of the pressure on refugee camps and refugee hosting communities.

Preconditions for resettlement consideration

It is understood there will always be individuals in need of priority resettlement. Because the need far outstrips the availability, countries including Canada, ask that the UNHCR identify their top five priority groups or refugee populations. Priorities are determined based on a number of factors and conditions.

For the UNHCR to refer anyone for resettlement, certain pre-conditions must be met. Following this, the agency further delineates who may be referred based on a sub-set of needs.

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[1] The MFU concept was then used by eight countries, including Canada, to resettle Bhutanese refugees. In 2007, several states, including the countries in the region, used the principles in the MFU to enable large scale Iraqi resettlement.

The first pre-condition is that the applicant is determined to be a refugee by UNHCR. Exceptions can be made for non-refugee stateless persons for whom resettlement has become necessary and also for the resettlement of certain non-refugee dependent family members to retain family unity. The UNHCR's appeal to Canada to resettle Haitian women is an example of this type of exception. The second pre-condition is that the prospects for all three durable solutions were assessed, and resettlement is identified as the most appropriate solution in the medium to long term. In essence, persons who can now or be reasonably expected in the future to have access to another durable solution are not normally eligible for resettlement.

Once the UNHCR has identified persons for whom resettlement would be the most appropriate solution, priority is given to persons who fall within one of the vulnerable categories listed in the table below. The table lists is the percentage of UNHCR referrals in 2011 which fell under the relevant category. In 2011, referrals for other reasons accounted for less than 2% of all referrals.

Category	When used	% in 2011
Legal and/or Physical Protection Needs	Refugee still at risk in country of refuge, including a threat of refoulement	46%
Survivors of Torture and/or Violence	Where repatriation or the conditions of asylum could result in further traumatization and/or heightened risk; or where appropriate treatment is not available	18%
Medical Needs	Particular life-saving treatment that is unavailable in the country of refuge	2%
Women and Girls at Risk	Females who have protection problems particular to their gender in the country of refuge	10%
Family Reunification	When resettlement is the only means to reunite refugee family members who, owing to refugee flight, are separated by borders	1%
Children and Adolescents at Risk	Where a best interests determination supports resettlement	<1%
Lack of Foreseeable Alternative Durable Solutions	Generally is relevant only when other solutions are not feasible in the foreseeable future, when resettlement can be used strategically, and/or when it can open possibilities for comprehensive solutions	21%

As the number of refugees identified as in need of resettlement far outstrips the availability of global resettlement places, further planning and prioritization is required to make decisions on which cases to submit in a given year. UNHCR Headquarters prepares an annual report on the *Projected Global Resettlement Needs*, which reflects the needs for the following year(s) and the rationale and scope of UNHCR's resettlement operations worldwide. This document is presented to the resettlement partners at the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR), and serves both as a primary planning tool and the main reference document for discussions with resettlement States on the allocation of their resettlement quota.

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The UNHCR determines its resettlement priorities for populations based on a number of factors including: the number of refugees being hosted by neighbouring countries (the higher the number, the more of a priority it is to resettle some to encourage host countries to continue providing asylum to others); the conditions in the asylum country; the length of time the refugee population has been in exile; and, where resettlement can be used strategically.

Current Resettlement Context:
From a purely pragmatic perspective, the UNHCR needs to also set priorities based on U.S. program interests. No country is legally obliged to resettle refugees. And while 26 countries offer resettlement on a regular basis, allocating budgets, devising programmes and providing annual resettlement quotas, the U.S. is the main financial contributor to UNHCR resettlement activities and admits fully 80% of all refugees resettled. (The USA, Canada, Australia and Sweden (in that order) account for 94% of all resettlement submissions by UNHCR and all actual admissions). The U.S. relies on having at least one large scale multi-year movement underway in order to meet its resettlement goals.

In Europe, only the Netherlands and the U.K. accept enough referrals on an annual basis to be in the top ten resettlement countries. France and Germany recently announced resettlement programs but their numbers remain in the low hundreds. Canada and the U.S. have been instrumental in working with the UNHCR to open up resettlement space in Europe. Canada has hosted various delegations from EU states and has presented at various EU fora to explain our programs and to facilitate exchanges of information. While progress has been slow, in March 2012, the Joint EU Resettlement Programme was established. This new Programme aims for an increase in resettlement places in the EU through different measures. For 2013, among others, the resettlement of refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Myanmar, and Eritrea will be the priority by the EU. The ultimate goal is to have 20,000 UNCHR refugees resettled annually to European countries by the year 2020.

Canadian Resettlement Context and Priorities
The setting of individual mission targets for Canada's resettlement program is based on a number of factors including the Government of Canada's foreign and other policy priorities and security considerations as well as UNHCR requests for Canadian engagement in specific places or populations. However, while policy priorities determine the types of refugees Canada will focus on, operational realities influence from where we will select refugees. Resettlement accounts for less than 6% of the immigration levels plan for permanent residents and for less than 2% of all CIC's immigration activities worldwide when temporary visa work (students, temporary foreign worker and visitors) is taken into account. As a result, decisions about where to focus refugee targets must take into account what other decisions have been taken as regards other immigration priorities. In addition, missions which already have inventories of other immigrant lines, missions with large caseloads of private sponsorship applications, areas where we can and cannot operate safely or have access to refugee populations and where Canada's presence may make a difference are other factors taken into consideration. Based on these factors, the Department discusses with each and every mission what they have to do to meet Ministerial priorities (FSW, Ministerial instructions, public policy etc.), what they can do and where they can meet the 'have to do' most easily' based on the resources allocated. The Department then looks at where opportunities exist to include refugee resettlement in the mission's overall immigration plan

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because of exceptional expertise that has been built up, where there are excellent partnerships in place with other partners like UNHCR or other embassies working in the same regions.

For example, the expertise and partnerships on the ground established in the mid-2000s in Asia through the multilateral effort on Karen refugees out of Thailand made the resettlement of over 5,000 Bhutanese much easier for Canada and the strong resettlement program established out of our mission in Singapore will lend itself to future resettlement initiatives in the region.

Once the Department makes decisions about where we can best focus our attention, discussions take place with the UNHCR about which refugee groups may be referred to Canada. The starting point is identifying the Government of Canada's protection priorities. For example, Canada is one country that lobbied for UNHCR to include gender sensitive programming in its camp management. For this reason, Canada has been resettling single mothers and female headed households. More recently, the Government announced that equality of women and protection of religious minorities and persons persecuted on sexual orientation are foreign policy priorities. In the resettlement context, this could lead to a greater focus on selecting refugees from religious and sexual orientation minorities that remain at risk in the country of asylum as well as placing a greater emphasis on female refugees at risk due to inequality of treatment in the country of asylum.

The UNHCR must also make choices about where to place its resettlement focus and provides this information to the resettlement community in June for the following calendar year. Every year, after the tabling of the Immigration Levels Plan in November, CIC informs the UNHCR of how many new refugee referrals are needed for each mission in the coming calendar year.

Current Global Refugee Context and Priorities
In 2011[2], three refugee populations made up 61% of all UNHCR referrals: Myanmarese, Iraqi and Somali. These priorities have been established due to the sheer numbers of persons displaced and the need to keep asylum space open for these populations given the ongoing and prolonged nature of the displacement. It is important to note that while UNHCR referred over 91 thousand persons for resettlement, only 61,649 UNHCR referred refugees departed to 22 countries. Canada's non-UNHCR referrals (e.g. privately sponsored refugees and public policy admissions) are not counted in these totals. The low number of persons resettled is due in part to the introduction of new security screening requirements by the USA and also due to challenges in accessing refugee populations. Iraqi and Somali refugees were particularly affected due to security issues in accessing refugees.

UNHCR estimates the global resettlement needs at over 859,300 persons and estimates that out of this number, 181,000 refugees need to be resettled in 2013. The total number of resettlement places for UNHCR referrals however stands at 81,000. By country of origin, Somalis, Iraqis, Myanmarese, Afghans, and Congolese are the top five refugee populations in need of resettlement in 2013. Again, most priorities have to do with protection need and the high number of persons that need to be resettled in order to preserve protection space in the region.

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[2] Figures for 2012 will not be available until July 2013. While the unrest in the Middle East has disrupted several countries' resettlement programs, it is expected that Burmese will remain among the top three populations.

The Congolese have recently been added as a priority in order to ensure the USA program is able to operate in large numbers but also because of the recent outflow of Congolese; resettling Congolese refugees who were displaced before 2012 will help keep space open for the newer outflows. Additionally, in the Americas, UNHCR considers the growing needs of Colombians in Ecuador to be the priority over Colombians in other countries of asylum in the region. Below is a short description of each priority population.

Somali: UNHCR has appealed to states to use resettlement in Kenya to keep space open for Dadaab. Given the sheer numbers (470,000 persons in Dadaab camp in Kenya alone) and inaccessibility, UNHCR has shifted its focus from large scale Somali resettlement of the older camp population to focussing on individuals who are in urgent need of physical protection and other vulnerable cases.

Iraqi: Iraqis and non-Iraqis in Syria remain a very real priority for UNHCR. Iraqis still represent one of the largest refugee populations in the world and resettlement of this group will allow UNHCR to also assist Syrians in need. The UNHCR has also asked countries to consider 8000 non-Iraqis and 3000 Palestinians ex-Iraq out of Syria.

Burmese: UNHCR is stepping away from large scale resettlement of ethnic minorities originating from Burma (Myanmar) and is now focussing on the vulnerable and potential residual populations. It is acknowledged that repatriation for those on the Thai borders may happen much faster than repatriation for Burmese refugees in Malaysia given cost and distance. There is very little hope of repatriation for the Rohingya in Bangladesh given Burma's ongoing treatment of this group. The USA has resettled over 60,000 Burmese refugees and will continue resettling out of Malaysia and hopes to be able to move into Bangladesh to resettle Rohingya.

Afghans: As regards Afghans, UNHCR is looking for a minimum number of resettlement spaces (1,300) for Pakistan and views this number as critical to their negotiations with Pakistan on local integration for Afghans. Canada's response to this appeal has been to remind UNHCR that Canada has been resettling about 700 Afghans per year for over a decade when one considers our Private Sponsorship of Refugees program and that this number should be used in discussions with Pakistan.

Congolese: The UNHCR has identified Congolese in four countries to be the focus of the next large scale multiyear and hopefully, multilateral resettlement effort beginning in 2014/15. Up to 50,000 Congolese could be resettled, creating more asylum space in Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania and Burundi. This group will never be able to return and large scale resettlement of this group could help maintain asylum space in the region. The US will be the key player although other countries, including Canada, are being asked to consider engaging with this group.

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Annex B: Horn of African Refugees

Issue: Description of the conflicts people are fleeing from in the Horn of Africa region.

Background:

For 2013, the UNHCR has identified five top populations for resettlement, two of which are African: Somali and Congolese[1]. In 2010, 95 per cent of UNHCR referrals for refugees from the Horn of Africa region to resettlement countries were from five countries of origin: Somalia (58% of the submissions), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (18%), Ethiopia (10%), Eritrea (7%) and Sudan (2 per cent). The remaining 5 per cent of referrals were for very small numbers of persons from another 27 different countries. The UNHCR's top nationalities are reflected in Nairobi's inventory with persons from Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea accounting for 86% of Nairobi's PSR inventory and for 64% of the current GAR (UNHCR) inventory.

There has been some progress in 2011 toward resolution of outstanding issues concerning major refugee populations in Africa. The UNHCR invoked cessation of refugee status for refugees from Angola and Liberia on June 30, 2012 and plans to invoke the cessation clause for refugees from Burundi and Rwanda by June 2013.

At the same time, continued fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia forced tens of thousands to flee during 2011 and the first half of 2012. Eritreans and Ethiopians continue to seek asylum in neighbouring countries due to increasing political repression. In addition, in Eritrea and Sudan religious freedom is limited, particularly in the midst of ethnic and other conflicts. Eritrea and Sudan are currently designated as a "Countries of Particular Concern" by the US Office for Religious Freedom, for particularly severe violations of religious freedom. Additionally, the recent division of Sudan into two countries has created new conflicts on the border area and all of South Sudan is considered too dangerous for refugees from older conflicts to return to at the present time.

Summary – UNHCR referrals

It should be noted that the GAR inventory in Nairobi is an old one; less than 300 new referrals were received in 2010 from the UNHCR and none in 2011 at CIC's request. This temporary moratorium on new referrals by UNHCR was imposed in order to: allow CIC time to focus on the PSR backlog; to clean out some GAR caseloads where possible; and to ensure the UNHCR referred inventory did not become as large as that of the PSR one. CIC did ask for an additional 1,000 new referrals for 2012 but far fewer have been received from easily accessible places than desired. Difficulty accessing refugee camps in the eighteen countries served by Nairobi has complicated processing of UNHCR cases. For example, a significant portion of the Somali caseload is in one camp in Eritrea which CIC has been barred access to by Eritrean authorities. Ethiopians in Somalia are likewise very difficult to access.

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[1] By country of origin, Somalis, Iraqis, Burmese, Afghans, and Congolese (COD) are the top five refugee populations in need of resettlement in 2013.

<u>*Summary – PSR referrals*</u>

Privately sponsored refugees are also dispersed among Nairobi's vast region of responsibility. Many however are in camps in Kenya and significant numbers reside in Nairobi itself. The inventory is also an old one and the cap placed on Nairobi submissions in 2012 means that very few new referrals have been made (the sub cap was placed at 130 persons total for all SAHs).

Refugee claims

<u>Sources:</u> US Department of State (country reports), US 2012 Report to Congress on Refugee Admissions, 2013 UNHCR Global Resettlement Needs.

Somalia: The UNHCR has identified Somalis as their major refugee priority for 2012 and 2013. Somalia has been without a government since the early 1990s. In Somalia, extremist militias have taken control over significant territory in the country. Militia groups, particularly those associated with the foreign terrorist organization Al-Shabaab, have often imposed through violence a strict interpretation of Islam on communities under their control (the population of Somalia is 99.9% Muslim). There have also been reports that individuals who do not practice Islam experience discrimination, violence, and detention because of their non-belief or not deeply held Islamic religious beliefs.

Civil war and armed conflict, leading to a general and massive violation of human rights, have caused Somalis to flee. Today, over 800,000 Somalis have sought asylum in neighbouring countries, with no prospect of return to war-torn Somalia. The famine of 2011 has only added to the stress of the camps in which Somalis reside..

Eritrea: According to the USA's Report on Religious Freedom, the Government of Eritrea is responsible for the most severe religious freedom abuses in Africa. Another more common refugee claim however for Eritreans is fear of return to face torture or the death penalty.

Eritrea is a one-party state that became independent in 1993 after its citizens voted for independence from Ethiopia, following 30 years of civil war. General elections have not taken place since independence in 1993. Human rights abuses include abridgement of citizens' right to change their government through a democratic process; unlawful killings by security forces; torture and beating of prisoners, sometimes resulting in death; abuse and torture of national service evaders; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention, including of national service evaders and their family members; executive interference in the judiciary and the use of a special court system to limit due process; and infringement of privacy rights.

The government severely restricts freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and religion. There is no due process and persons remain in jail for years. The government also limits freedom of movement and travel for all citizens. National service obligations are effectively open-ended although the government does not acknowledge this circumstance. Evading or leaving the military conscription makes one 'an enemy of the state' which is punishable by death. Many of

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Ethiopia: While Ethiopia is considered one of Africa's most stable states, its people continue to flee due to the repressive regime in power since the early 1990s. The Prime Minister, in power for 20 years allows no criticism of the government and while Ethiopia's laws provide for freedom of information, access to public information is largely restricted in practice, and the government has traditionally limited coverage of official events to state-owned media outlets. In a negative trend, several legislative measures taken in 2009 explicitly targeted the media, while others had repercussions for the overall media environment. In January 2011, the Proclamation for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies was passed by the parliament, curtailing the ability of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to operate in sectors other than education, health, and food security. As a result, international NGOs faced significant restrictions on implementing projects in the areas of governance and human rights, including freedom of expression. The UN Committee Against Torture noted in a November 19, 2011 report that it was "deeply concerned" about the continuation of the "numerous, ongoing, and consistent allegations" concerning "the routine use of torture" by the police, prison officers and other members of the security forces--as well as the military, in particular--against political dissidents and opposition party members, students, alleged terrorists, and alleged supporters of insurgents. The committee reported that such acts frequently occurred with the participation of, at the instigation of, or with the consent of commanding officers in police stations, detention centers, federal prisons, military bases, and unofficial or secret places of detention.

Sudan (South and North): Sudan has been in turmoil for almost 30 years. While the root causes are complicated, the decision by the President in 1983 to incorporate traditional Islamic punishments into the penal code with southerners and other non-Muslims living in the north also subjected to these punishments played a part in the escalation of tensions between the north and south. Roughly two million people have died as a result of war, famine and disease caused by the conflict. Four million people in southern Sudan have been displaced at least once during the war and over 380,000 Sudanese refugees remain in neighbouring countries. The conflict officially ended with the signing of a peace agreement in 2005 which culminated in a two state arrangement in 2011. While the new Government of South Sudan generally respects the rights of Christians and Muslims in the states of the south, the Government of Sudan (North) continues to place restrictions on non-Muslims. Like Eritrea, Sudan (North) is currently designated as a "Country of Particular Concern" by the US Office for Religious Freedom, for severe violations of religious freedom. The ongoing persecution of persons in the north as well as the persistent conflict right at the border of the new countries has led to a new outflow of refugees. South Sudan and its neighbours are slowly adjusting to the new regional reality following South Sudan's independence. Security remains a paramount concern given ongoing north-south tensions and continuing cross-border flows of refugees.

Rwanda: Most Rwandan refugees currently in process by CIC were victims of the 1994 genocide. The 1951 Refugee Convention provides for the cessation of refugee status of individuals and groups where international protection is no longer justified or necessary because conditions in the country where persecution was feared have changed, to an extent that the reasons for the person becoming a refugee no longer exist. The UNHCR has indicated that by

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June 2013, it will invoke cessation for most individuals who fled Rwanda between 1994 and 1998. Rwandese fleeing after 1998 may still be refugees. The Rwandans in the GAR inventory are persons the UNHCR has determined to be still in need of international protection in spite of the upcoming cessation clause. Privately sponsored refugees already in process would not be refused solely on the basis of the cessation clause although new referrals will not be accepted unless the person has been found, post-cessation, to still be in need of protection by the UNHCR.

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are nearly 404,000 Congolese refugees hosted in the DRC's eight neighbouring countries and in other areas. Refugees are fleeing the continued human rights violations that have been ongoing since the beginning of the Congo War. The war began after the collapse of a dictatorship in 1997 triggered a regional fight for the DRC's resources. While officially declared over in 2003, the war has left a series of ongoing and interconnected conflicts involving almost all countries in the Great Lakes region. In the DRC alone, almost 4 million persons have died as a result and another 4 million remain internally displaced.

The UNHCR is currently seeking views from the resettlement community, including Canada, to undertake a 4 year plan of action to ramp up a new large scale movement of up to 50,000 DR Congolese out of 4 countries: Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. In Tanzania, the priority will be on the 1996/97 arrivals while in Uganda, priority referrals will be women at risk. To date, Canada's response has been to encourage the UNHCR to provide complete population verifications for all four caseloads including comprehensive cultural and medical profiles for each. The USA fully expects to undertake large scale resettlement of this population beginning in 2013/14.

Internal conflict in several provinces has had an extremely negative effect on security and human rights. Armed groups continue to commit numerous, serious abuses with impunity--some of which may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity--including unlawful killings, disappearances, mass rape, and torture. They also recruit and retain child soldiers and compel forced labour. Mass rapes are becoming a common method of intimidation and revenge in eastern Congo with members of the police, the national army and armed rebel groups perpetrating the violence.

The DRC held presidential and parliamentary elections on November 28, 2011 which have been roundly denounced by the international community and the UN as having been 'too flawed to be credible'. A report released by the United Nations on November 9, 2011 warned that political manipulation of Congo's security forces and crackdowns on opposition parties would lead to bloodshed in the election. The ensuing violence following the elections has forced another 40,000 persons to flee into Uganda in 2012.

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Annex C: Somali Canadians

Introduction

The 2006 Census[1] reported 37,790 Canadians of Somali origin. Of these, 29,705 (79%) live in Ontario, particularly Toronto (49%) and Ottawa (21%). Communities also exist in Alberta (11%), specifically in Edmonton (8%). Six out of ten (58%) are immigrants. Others are generally Canadian-born (39%) – only a small number are non-permanent residents (2%). Most of those who immigrated were born in Somalia (80%), but many also came from neighboring countries, namely Ethiopia (6%) and Kenya (5%).

Population reporting Somali ethnic origin by place of residence for Canada, provinces and territories, and selected Census Metropolitan Areas, 2006 Census (20% data)

Place of residence	Total		Non-Immigrants	Immigrants	Non-permanent residents
	(number)	(%)	(number)	(number)	(number)
Newfoundland and Labrador	10	0.0%	10	0	0
Prince Edward Island	0	0.0%	0	0	0
Nova Scotia	75	0.2%	45	30	0
New Brunswick	120	0.3%	15	105	0
Quebec	1,220	3.2%	395	795	25
Montréal CMA	*890*	*2.4%*	*285*	*590*	*15*
Ottawa-Gatineau CMA (QC part)	*220*	*0.6%*	*50*	*170*	*0*
Ontario	*29,705*	*78.6%*	*11,590*	*17,435*	*670*
Ottawa-Gatineau CMA (ON part)	*7,815*	*20.7%*	*2,980*	*4,715*	*120*
Toronto CMA	*18,445*	*48.8%*	*7,375*	*10,575*	*495*
Kitchener CMA	*730*	*1.9%*	*290*	*425*	*10*
Manitoba	650	1.7%	255	390	10
Saskatchewan	290	0.8%	75	215	0
Alberta	*4,230*	*11.2%*	*1,825*	*2,280*	*125*
Calgary CMA	*965*	*2.6%*	*430*	*520*	*15*
Edmonton CMA	*2,865*	*7.6%*	*1,335*	*1,505*	*25*
British Columbia	*1,460*	*3.9%*	*700*	*750*	*10*
Vancouver CMA	*1,325*	*3.5%*	*625*	*690*	*10*
Yukon	*0*	*0.0%*	*0*	*0*	*0*
Northwest Territories	30	0.1%	0	25	0
Nunavut	10	0.0%	10	0	0
Canada	**37,790**	**100.0%**	**14,910**	**22,040**	**840**

Note: Due to privacy considerations, the figures in this table have been subjected to random rounding. Under this method, all figures in the table are randomly rounded either up or down to multiples of "5". As a result, components may not sum to total indicated.

Source: 2006 Census - Statistics Canada, Cat. no. 97-564-XCB2006007

Maps showing the geographic distribution in Canada of people of Somali ethnic origin by immigration status are attached to this document.

The age distribution of Somali Canadians is more skewed towards younger age groups compared to the overall population. For instance, those under age 15 or aged 15 to 24 account for respectively 43% and 18% of all Somali Canadians. This is respectively 25 and 5 percentage points higher than in the total Canadian population. In contrast, the proportion of seniors (i.e.

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[1] No data highlighting ethnocultural community characteristics will be available from the 2011Census/NHS before summer 2013.

those 65 years and over) among Somali Canadians is much lower than in Canada's overall population (i.e. about 3% compared with 13%). The gender distribution is relatively even, similar to that of the overall population.

Persons reporting Somali ethnic origin by age and sex, Canada, 2006 census (20% sample)

Age groups	Total		Male	Female
	(number)	(%)	(number)	(number)
Under 15 years	16,105	42.6%	8,395	7,705
15 to 24 years	6,840	18.1%	3,320	3,520
25 to 54 years	12,865	34.0%	5,530	7,340
25 to 44 years	*9,860*	*26.1%*	*3,920*	*5,935*
45 to 54 years	*3,010*	*8.0%*	*1,605*	*1,405*
55 to 64 years	965	2.6%	420	540
65 years and over	1,020	2.7%	390	630
Total - Age groups	**37,790**	**100.0%**	**18,055**	**19,735**

Note: Due to privacy considerations, the figures in this table have been subjected to random rounding. Under this method, all figures in the table are randomly rounded either up or down to multiples of "5". As a result, components may not sum to total indicated.

Source: Statistics Canada, 2006 Census of Canada (Catalogue Number: 97-564-XCB2006007)

History of immigration to Canada

In the late 1970s, there were very few Somalis in Canada. The political strife in Somalia greatly increased migration and the flight of refugees, so that Somalia became the source of the second-largest number of refugee claimants in Canada in the first half of the 1990s.

According to John Sorenson[2], settlement in Canada has not been without problems. Because the Somalis fled as refugees from conditions of total war in their homeland, many were undocumented. This has left many, perhaps the majority, in a state of limbo facing difficulties in proving their status, obtaining employment and being unable to sponsor relatives. As recent arrivals in Canada, Somalis settled in somewhat isolated communities and have remained within them, engaged in the first stages of the difficult process of establishing themselves in conditions that are vastly different from their homeland, as well as under circumstances of financial, legal, and psychological stress.

Based on CIC's *Facts and Figures 2010*, over 35,200 Somali-born were granted permanent residence in Canada between 1980 and 2010 – with half of them obtaining their status in the first half of the 1990s . Eight out of ten (77%) were refugees and 17% family class immigrants.

Socio-cultural characteristics

According to the 2006 Census[3], approximately one-third (30%) of Somali Canadians report English or French (with or without a non-official language) as their mother tongue. The youngest people in the community (likely born in Canada) account for most of those reporting English or French as their mother tongue. Few (less than 5%) have no command of either English or French.

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[2] In the Encyclopedia of Canada's People, retreived from http://www.multiculturalcanada.ca/Encyclopedia/A-Z/s9/6 consulted July24, 2012. John Sorenson is Professor in the Department of Sociology, Brock University.

[3] No data highlighting ethnocultural community characteristics will be available from the 2011Census/NHS before summer 2013.

Almost all Canadians of Somali origin are Muslim (96% according to Census 2001). Only 2% said they had no religious affiliation (in contrast with 17% in Canada's total population).

Socio-economic characteristics

Based on findings from the 2006 Census for the population 25–54 years of age:

- Only 13% Somali Canadians are university graduates, compared with 24% in the total population of Canada. Women in the community have a particularly low educational achievement. Only 9% have a university degree (much lower than 25% in Canada's total population). Over 60% of Somali Canadian women aged 25-54 hold, at best, a secondary school diploma. These relatively low levels of education are reflected in the community's labour market outcomes.

- The labour force participation rate for Somali Canadians is 64% compared with 86% in the total population. The labour force participation rate for Somali Canadian women is also much lower (50%) compared with Somali Canadian men (82%) or with the total female population of Canada (81%).

- The employment rate of Somali Canadians is 53%, much lower than 81% in the total population. The rate for Somali Canadian women was only 39%, much lower than the rate for Somali Canadian men (72%) and for the total female population of Canada (76%).

- The unemployment rate for Somali Canadians was 16.4%, about three times the rate for the total population (5.4%). The rate for Somali Canadian women was 21.5%, much higher than the rate for Somali Canadian men (12.2%) and the total female population of Canada (5.6%).

In 2005, the prevalence of low income (after-tax) among Somali Canadians of all age groups (57%) was more than five times the rate in the total population of Canada (11%).

Country of origin

According to the United States CIA's *World Factbook* [4], Britain withdrew from British Somaliland in 1960 to allow its protectorate to join with Italian Somaliland and form the new nation of Somalia. In 1969, a coup headed by Mohamed Siad Barre ushered in a regime characterized by the persecution, jailing and torture of political opponents. After the regime's collapse early in 1991, Somalia descended into turmoil and factional fighting. Beginning in 1993, a two-year UN humanitarian effort (primarily in the south) was able to alleviate famine conditions, but, when the UN withdrew in 1995, order still had not been restored. Since 2000, Somalia has been led by a series of transitional governing entities. Numerous clan and sub-clan factions exist both in support and in opposition to the transitional government. Although a transitional government exists, other regional and local governing bodies continue to control various regions of the country, including the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in northwestern Somalia and the semi-autonomous State of Puntland in northeastern Somalia.

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[4] In "Somalia", retreived from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html on 24 July 2012.

According to our Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade[5], Canada maintains a working relationship with Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) through the Canadian High Commission in Nairobi, Kenya, but has not had an Ambassador accredited to Somalia since 1990. Canada continues to closely monitor the security and humanitarian situation in Somalia. We support regional efforts to create a more stable and secure environment to facilitate humanitarian assistance to the millions of people affected by drought and famine in eastern Africa. Due to the lack of governing institutions and adequate infrastructure, Canada has minimal trade relations with Somalia. Two-way merchandise trade in 2010 was $2.3 million.

Selected Country and People Facts:[6]

- Somalia is located in the eastern-most part of Africa. It is bordered by Djibouti to the northwest, Kenya to the southwest, the Gulf of Aden to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east and Ethiopia to the west.

- It has a total land area of 637,657 sq km, 6% the size of Canada. Somalia has a population estimated at 10,085,638 people (July 2012) or about one-third the size of the Canadian population. About 85% are ethnic Somali.

- Languages spoken are Somali (official), Arabic (official, according to the Transitional Federal Charter[7]), Italian and English. Somali is a Cushitic language, and is similar to that spoken by the Galla and Afar in Ethiopia.

- Sunni Muslim (Islam) is the official religion according to the Transitional Federal Charter.

- Its population is extraordinarily young with an estimated median age of 17.8 years, compared with 40.6 years for Canada (Census 2011). The 0-14 age group accounts for an estimated 45% of the Somali population, almost three times the proportion of this age group in Canada's total population (16.7%). The 15-64 segment represents 53% (68.5% for Canada's total population).

Useful references

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McGown, Rima Berns. *Muslims in the Diaspora: The Somali Canadians in London and Toronto.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.

Sorenson, John. "Somalis," in the *Encyclopedia of Canada's Peoples*, edited by Paul R. Magocsi, 1195–1201. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999.

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[5] In "Somalia" retreived from http://www.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/geo.aspx?view=d on 25 July 2012.

[6] In United States Central Intelligence Agency, "Somalia", retreived from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html on 25 July 2012.

[7] A Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) was established in February 2004 which outlined a five-year mandate leading to the establishment of a new Somali constitution and a transition to a representative government. following national elections. In January 2009, the TFC was amended to extend Transitional Federal Government's mandate.

Total population reporting Somali ethnic origin by immigrant status, Canada, provinces and territories, 2006 Census, 20% sample

Yukon Territory

Northwest Territories
30

Nunavut
10

British Columbia
1,460
48%
51%
1%

Alberta
4,225
43%
54%
3%

Saskatchewan
290
26%
74%

Manitoba
650
39%
59%
2%

Ontario
29,700
39%
59%
2%

Quebec
1,215
33%
65%
2%

New Brunswick
120

Prince Edward Island

Nova Scotia
75

Newfoundland and Labrador
10

Canada
37,790
39%
59%
2%

Total population of province/ territory reporting Somali ethnic origin

Less than or equal to 1,000
1,001 to 5,000
Greater than 5,000

Total population reporting Somali ethnic origin by immigrant status

Non-immigrants
Immigrants
Non-permanent residents

Note: Pie chart is not shown where total population reporting Somali ethnic origin is less than 200

000050

Total population reporting Somali ethnic origin by immigrant status, Canada, selected census metropolitan areas and census agglomerations (CMA/CA), 2006 Census, 20% sample

Canada
37,790

Note: Canada pie chart is not proportional to size of population

Toronto
18,440

Ottawa-
Gatineau (QC)
225

Ottawa-
Gatineau (ON)
7,815

Montréal
890

Hamilton
880

St. Catharines-
Niagara
360

Windsor
570

London
575

Kitchener
725

Vancouver
1,325

Edmonton
2,865

Calgary
965

Wood
Buffalo
260

Winnipeg
650

Total population of CMA/CA reporting Somali ethnic origin

● Between 200 and 500

○ Greater than 500 — showing immigrant status

Non-immigrants
Immigrants
Non-permanent residents

Note: CMA/CA is not shown where total population reporting Somali ethnic origin is less than 200

Source: Statistics Canada, 2006 Census, 97-564-XCB2006007, Special Interest Profiles

000051

Immigrant population reporting Somali ethnic origin by period of immigration, Canada, provinces and territories, 2006 Census, 20% sample

Yukon Territory

Northwest Territories
25

Nunavut

Newfoundland and Labrador

Prince Edward Island

New Brunswick
105

Nova Scotia
30

British Columbia
750
59% 23% 18%

Alberta
2,280
59% 27% 14%

Saskatchewan
215
72% 28%

Manitoba
390
42% 49% 9%

Ontario
17,435
63% 18% 19%

Quebec
795
75% 16% 9%

Canada
22,040
62% 17% 21%

Immigrant population of province/territory reporting Somali ethnic origin

Less than or equal to 1,000
1,001 to 5,000
Greater than 5,000

Total population reporting Somali ethnic origin by period of immigration

Immigrated before 1991
Immigrated from 1991 to 2000
Immigrated from 2001 to 2006

Note: Pie chart is not shown where immigrant population reporting Somali ethnic origin is less than 200

Source: Statistics Canada, 2006 Census, 97-564-XCB2006007, Special Interest Profiles

000052

Immigrant population reporting Somali ethnic origin by period of immigration, Canada, selected census metropolitan areas and census agglomerations (CMA/CA), 2006 Census, 20% sample

Immigrant population of CMA/CA reporting Somali ethnic origin

- Between 200 and 500
- Greater than 500 — showing period of immigration

Immigrated before 1991
Immigrated from 1991 to 2000
Immigrated from 2001 to 2006

Note: CMA/CA is not shown where immigrant population reporting Somali ethnic origin is less than 200

Toronto
10,575
65%
17%
18%

Ottawa-Gatineau (ON)
4,715
64%
22%
14%

Montreal
590
73%
19%
8%

Hamilton
625
48%
42%
10%

Kitchener
425

St. Catharines-Niagara
235

London
320

Windsor
355

Vancouver
690
57%
23%
20%

Calgary
520
45%
35%
20%

Edmonton
1,505
62%
14%
24%

Winnipeg
390

Canada
22,040
62%
17%
21%

Note: Canada pie chart is not proportional to size of population

Toronto
10,575

Montreal
590

Ottawa-Gatineau (ON)
4,715

Hamilton
625

Source: Statistics Canada, 2006 Census, 97-564-XCB2006007, Special Interest Profiles

METROPOLIS

INTEGRATING YOUNG CANADIANS OF MINORITY BACKGROUNDS INTO MAINSTREAM CANADIAN SOCIETY: THE CASE OF SOMALI YOUTH

LAMIA NAJI

INTRODUCTION

Over 80% of the Somali-Canadian community, one of Canada's largest African minority groups, is under 30 years of age. Having been born in Canada or immigrated at a young age, a number of Somali youth are experiencing difficulty integrating into mainstream Canadian society. Why, despite their upbringing in Canada and access to social institutions, are some Somali-Canadian youth, exhibiting relatively poor societal outcomes?

To assess the migration experience of Somalis in Canada and better understand their experiences of social exclusion, 16 selected participants from national and foreign government, academia, and civil society took part in an informative and comprehensive discussion organized by the Metropolis Project. The specific questions guiding the Conversation were:

1. How do we define successful refugee re-settlement— is the offer of protection *enough*?
2. What have been the long-term implications of the initial settlement experience for previous/new Somali refugees and asylum seekers?
3. What are the underlying causes of the poor integration outcomes for some young Somali-Canadians?
4. What efforts are aimed at improving the short and long term integration experience of Somali-Canadian youth?
5. What should the roles of the federal, provincial and municipal governments be? How can we prevent similar problems for future asylum seekers or refugees?

Ultimately, responses to these questions revealed that the challenges faced by young Somali Canadians largely reflect a broader phenomenon: the experiences of low-income minority and immigrant youth residing in metropolitan Canadian cities. In particular, specific aspects of immigration, the public education system and social housing appear, in one form or another, to diminish the possibilities of a healthy and successful integration experience.

Notwithstanding general commonalities, however, the integration experience of Somali youth into mainstream Canadian society is found to be unique due to the complex migration experience of first-generation Somalis to Canada in the late 1980s and early 1990s; the actual and perceived effects of 'dual strikes' against Somali youth stemming from their racial (black) and religious (Muslim) composition; and the relatively large size of the Somali-Canadian community.

This report will describe the major recurring themes of the Metropolis Conversation on Somali youth, including the initial settlement experience of Somali-Canadians; youth identity construction; and the public perception of Somalis in Canada. The report will conclude with a note on refugee re-settlement and recommendations suggested by the participants.

BACKGROUND, INITIAL SETTLEMENT EXPERIENCE AND THE FIRST-GENERATION

The arrival of Somali refugees in Canada largely took place between 1988 and 1994. Prior to the late 1980s, only a few Somalis, mainly students and political exiles, lived in Canada. The ousting of General Siad Barre in 1991 and the subsequent outbreak of civil war coupled with a longstanding famine forced over one million Somalis to flee to neighbouring countries, Europe and North America.

Seeking protection, Somalis applied for Convention Refugee Status upon arrival to Canada and were subsequently afforded permanent resident status, typically within six months to three years of their arrival. The large influx of Somalis to Canada and suspicions of manipulation of Canada's immigration system resulted in changes to Canada's Immigration Act in 1993 that specifically affected Somali migrants. According to the Act, Convention Refugee Status would only be afforded to those in possession of 'satisfactory identity documents', leaving migrants without appropriate papers in a long period of limbo. Unable to retrieve documents due to the political turmoil in Somalia, Somali migrants waited as long as a decade to receive Convention Refugee Status. This delay lengthened the wait for permanent residency meaning that Somalis faced discrimination in access to education (mainly secondary and higher education), employment and social assistance. Repercussions from this policy curtailed their integration experience and that of subsequent generations. As many Somali households are female headed, a lack of support mechanisms for women and little education often meant greater difficulties in finding employment and less flexibility to support children, resulting in greater prospects for youth challenges in the long-run.

An important distinction to keep in mind with respect to the settlement experience of first-generation Somalis in particular is the response by the Canadian mainstream. Compared to the arrival of the Vietnamese 'Boat People' in 1979 and 1980, for instance, it has been argued that Canadians were relatively ill prepared to receive Somalis, uninformed of the plight of the Somali people. The Vietnamese case is a Canadian success story because, with the help of federal government assistance, various church and community groups voluntarily undertook initiatives to welcome and assist those who fled communism. Conversely, Canadians were largely taken aback by the arrival of Somalis resulting in miscommunication on both sides as migration-related trauma, 'limbo' status and arrival to a foreign country shocked Somali migrants. Failing to provide first-generation Somalis adequate settlement services, including mental health support, during their initial phases of arrival, therefore, played a detrimental role in their integration.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF SOMALIS IN CANADA

Despite the many success stories and the resilience of the Somali-Canadian community, public opinion of Somali-Canadians is greatly shaped by negative depictions which can lead to racism, prejudice and Islamophobia. Since the arrival of Somalis in Canada, the perception of the Somali community by mainstream Canadian society has largely been moulded by the media and geopolitics. Media analyses reveal that reporting on the 1992 and 1993 Peacekeeping missions in Somalia presented Somalis as either victims or warlords, while coverage of the 'War on Terror' and piracy have cast Somalis

as perpetrators. Domestically, the rendering of Somali youth as drug-dealers and 'home-grown' extremists has further tainted how Somali-Canadians are perceived.

These negative perceptions contribute to a hostile environment towards Somali-Canadians in academic, employment and social settings. This seriously impedes their integration experience by directly lowering their confidence and self-esteem and providing reasons for the formation of a defensive attitude as well as self-alienation.

CONSTRUCTING AN IDENTITY: FINDING THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE

Somali-Canadian youth, like many immigrant youth, face the challenge of reconciling the cultural traditions of their country of origin with the cultural norms of Canadian society. This means making the family happy at home and fitting into the societal mainstream. As young Somalis are challenged in negotiating two very different worlds, a lack of effective guidance (mentorship that recognizes and understands *both* worlds) gives rise to difficulties with respect to finding an appropriate balance.

The Somali identity is principally shaped by Islam and cultural practises that collectively form the everyday decisions and lives of the Somali people. In the eyes of first-generation parents, elements of Canadian mainstream culture, largely encountered in school settings and through popular media, contradict what is considered as being Somali. This includes contrasts in terms of dress, mannerisms and opinions as the second-generation adopt relatively more liberal belief-systems. A major variation between Somali and Canadian values, for example, is that the former emphasizes the family unit while the latter encourages individual freedom and independence. Naturally, these differences create an intergenerational gap between first and second generation Somali-Canadians.

Tensions can arise in the home as the intergenerational gap widens. For instance, as youth gain skills and become translators and interpreters for their parents in everyday interactions, the power dynamic shifts from parent to child, giving rise to non-traditional role-reversals. Further, with access to knowledge-based employment, the second-generation can also be confronted with what can be the conflicting obligations of financially supporting the family and pursuing personal endeavours.

Challenges of constructing an individual identity also arise for reasons relating to race. Somalia is a homogenous society where differences are mainly along tribal clan lines or regions of origin, and not race. Somali youth, as one participant put it, must therefore learn how to be 'black' in Canadian society, a concept foreign to their parents. Since the first-generation is largely unable to assist with this process, many Somali youth, especially males, look to what is considered mainstream, black identity and the media for a sense of belonging. As the traditional Somali identity embodies Islam and traditional practices, youth are once again confronted with another set of ideals that clash with what they are *supposed* to be at home (Somali) and outside ('black'). This is a particular challenge for youth who are born in Canada and may not completely understand the nuances of their Somali heritage. While most Somali youth identify as being Somali, the construction of a black identity— which they perceive is a necessary societal component due to the colour of their skin— inevitably leads to confusion. The confusion is

problematic since Somali and black identity seem to have a negative correlation as greater immersion in black culture tends to mean further distance away from the expectations of parents and Somali culture.

The so-called black identity in North America is largely represented by African American and Caribbean cultures. As such, norms of these groups, including Hip Hop and Reggae music, tend to have a strong influence on many Somali youth. Programs such as 'Black Entertainment Television' (BET), which showcases music videos and life from the perspective of black America, resonate with Somali youth who feel they can relate to the experiences presented (for example, single-parent homes, marginalization, discrimination and poverty) . Popular mainstream media can have negative effects on youth development since it, for example, largely limits the role of a successful black male to a rapper, thug, drug dealer or athlete. In the absence of a positive male role model, this proves unpromising for many Somali males.

Young Somali females usually tend to integrate more successfully than males due to their determination to 'not let their mothers down'. However, a young female Somali participant raised the concern that some Somali females are starting to demonstrate less favourable outcomes with respect to education (mainly at the secondary level) and trouble with the law. A growing willingness to partake in Al-Shabab related activities in Somalia is consistent with these concerns.

Overall, in the process of constructing an individual identity, a lack of appropriate and gender-specific mentorship creates uncertainty on how to balance cultural, parental and societal obligations. This can result in an individual feeling no belonging anywhere or choosing between two cultures (and sometimes either extreme) as opposed to embracing the values of both.

PUBLIC EDUCATION

Education is a key determinant of occupational success in Canadian society. One would assume that exposure to primary, elementary and secondary education in Canada would cultivate a successful integration experience for the children of immigrants and minority youth. This Conversation revealed critical barriers in the public education system that culturally and systematically inhibits the integration experience for Somali and visible minority youth at-large.

There is a noticeable difference in how education is perceived between Somali culture and Canadian mainstream culture. In the former, the role of the school and the educator is distinct and separate from the role of the family such that the teacher and institutions of the school are seen as responsible for a child's education experience. In the latter however, there is an expectation that a child's education experience is facilitated by the active support and participation of the parent which is demonstrated through homework help, guidance and volunteerism, among other initiatives. In many instances, immigrant parents, displaying their cultural understanding of what teaching is, often leave all the decision making to the school authorities, not informed of their vital and crucial roles to the development of curriculum policies and the advancement of their child.

This difference in expectations between the school and the Somali parent, if overlooked and misunderstood, presents serious challenges for a Somali-Canadian child going through the education system, often increasing the possibility for a child to fall behind at an early age. This dilemma is further frustrated as public education systems interpret falling behind as indicating a 'learning disability' or behavioural problems. In primary and elementary schools, for instance, diagnoses of autism are high among Somali children. Researchers as well as members of the Somali community, including doctors, are wary of the number of reported cases, especially since an increasing number of 'hyper boys' are diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Hyperactivity can be a reflection of not knowing how to behave in an academic setting and not necessarily an illness. Assessments for ADHD or autism are problematic because they are costly, standardized, and do not incorporate cross-cultural circumstances. Similarly, at the secondary level, there is a high proportion of Somali and minority youth in applied, technical courses as opposed to academic, university preparing courses. The down-streaming of Somali and visible minority youth effectively diminishes post-secondary education options and career opportunities from as early as the ninth grade.

There is a stigma associated with 'learning disabilities' or applied courses which can cause minority youth to believe that they are in fact less academically oriented than their peers. This can result in a decrease in morale and higher probabilities of dropping out. Sentiments of this kind were said to cause young Somali males to bring themselves down when they are together. Dropping out is also more likely if youth feel they cannot relate to the course offerings or curriculum.

Further, there is a general sense that minority and immigrant youth face harsher punishments in schools in the form of suspensions and expulsions as teachers are said to report behavioural concerns without proper contexts and without further critical attempts to understand underlying problems.

Finally, many minority youth who have resiliently pursued post-graduate education are having difficulty finding employment due to a lack of knowledge on how to navigate the labour market. This primarily involves challenges arising from not having established support systems, connections or networks in key areas of employment as well as unfamiliarity with initiatives available through academic institutions such as FSWEP and Co-operative education.

SOCIAL HOUSING: 'A POSINED BENEFIT'

While social housing makes accommodation affordable for low-income households, it was found that social housing, in many instances, has the potential to perpetuate the marginalization and disintegration of minority youth. For new immigrant families and minority groups moving into municipal social housing neighbourhoods, the presence of residents from similar cultural backgrounds and experiences can facilitate a more comfortable transition for parents and their offspring.

In the long-run, however, social housing can have negative consequences. Social housing serves various groups in the low-income spectrum including the mentally ill, drug-users, and previous criminal offenders. Naturally, the 'neighbourhood effect' can present an unhealthy environment for children and youth who grow up in these areas.

Moreover, a high presence of a specific minority group within a social housing complex can discourage outward mobility and makes possible the establishment of social-housing-created ethnic enclaves. These settings present greater risks for youth, particularly males, by creating a disconnect between community housing neighbourhoods and mainstream society. This disconnect can condone 'group think' and in turn prevent youth from reaching their potential in academic and employment spheres. It can also encourage youth to seek alternative methods of subsistence, including involvement in the lucrative drug-trade.

Not all social housing neighbourhoods present risky environments for minority youth. Different social housing areas can share similar population sizes and demographics but convey different societal outcomes based on the social housing grouping or location in a city. It is evident, however, that in many instances the realities of social housing communities do not reflect the ideals of the 'Canadian' community. These realities can impede youth development.

CONCLUSION: RE-THINKING REFUGEE RE-SETTLEMENT

Refugee re-settlement is normally considered to be limited to bringing refugees to Canada to live permanently. While today's settlement services are more sophisticated than in previous decades, the question remains whether protection is enough, given the high possibility of poor long-term societal outcomes. Effectively, how does Canada balance humanitarian protection obligations and the realities that some refugee communities *will* struggle?

Evidently, prospects of a successful integration experience within Canada depends on various factors including the existence of established community support networks, language competencies, access to essential social resources and skills development. With this in mind, the federal government must consider the short and long-term consequences of failing to provide the necessary tools to obtain such resources upon arrival and replicate best practises applied in Canadian success stories. While the financial costs of offering assistance to asylum seekers may seem high, they are arguably outweighed by the long-term social consequences of not providing adequate support, as made evident by the experience of Somali-Canadians and other newcomer groups. This is especially the case since many asylum seekers do in fact receive refugee status.

Accordingly, considerations of how to better equip the mainstream in welcoming newcomers must be taken seriously to ensure that the population is informed of the context and struggles faced by both refugee and asylum communities. If immigration and multiculturalism are to be conveyed as defining fundamental characteristics of Canada's mosaic, delivering on the promise of a new and meaningful life must be at the forefront of refugee re-settlement policy.

RECCOMENDATIONS

The following comprehensive recommendations were suggested by the participants in the Metropolis Conversation. Some recommendations are specific to Somali youth:

Refugee Re-settlement

- Review refugee re-settlement legislation to ensure all vulnerable groups, including asylum seekers and government assisted refugees (GARs), are provided with adequate support systems
- Ensure that females heading households, under the Government Assisted Refugee programme, receive adequate support to integrate into Canadian society by providing resources such as language and employment training and child care supports
- Re-define protection to include more support measures for asylum seekers
- Equip the mainstream population and non-governmental organizations with resources that will inform the public of new arrivals and facilitate a healthy exchange between host communities and refugees

Embedding a Positive Outlook of Somalis and Minorities in Canada

- Address racism and Islamphobia in all levels of government to create a space for inter-cultural dialogue.
- Recognize the achievement of leaders in visible minority communities through awards provided by government, particularly at the municipal level, to encourage the continuance of leadership initiatives

Education

- Create integrated and holistic community support systems and programs for immigrant families within institutional frameworks
- Integrate the histories and experiences of students in classrooms provincial curriculums
- Incorporate strategies that maximize the roles of guidance councillors to accommodate immigrant and second-generation youth, especially those who are also working to support their families
- Increase the number of settlement workers and translators in schools
- Establish a more visible partnership between schools and parents that involves an equal sharing of power and information to make clear the expectations of both the student and parent
- Look to alternative methods of discipline (i.e. alternatives to suspensions and expulsions) in school settings to remove a sense of disproportionate punishment on minority youth
- Carefully, and through cross-cultural considerations, assess behavioural irregularities prior to diagnosing a student with ADHD

- Create mechanisms for the oversight and evaluation of programs directed at the academic achievement of marginalized youth
- Support community after-school and weekend programming such as Somali language training and homework help that can improve academic performance while also help in providing a sense of belonging

Social Housing

- Identify methods to encourage home ownership and offer training sessions on loans and micro-financing in consideration of traditional and religious beliefs
- Ensure municipal social housing agencies are not promoting the creation of ethnic enclaves in social housing
- Engage youth of lower socioeconomic statuses by offering after-school programming, homework help and extra-curricular activities free of charge which can act as channels to bridge youth into mainstream society

Government

- Increase the recruitment of visible minorities into the public service and political spheres to reflect Canada's diverse population
- Recognize the development of minority youth as a security priority in the Budget and government agendas
- *Ministries of Education*:
    o Invest in curriculum development to facilitate inclusiveness and representativeness
    o Incorporate intensive training in teacher's college on diversity and exceptionalities
    o Implement programs on anti-bullying specifically on race and Islamophobia.
- *Ministries of health*:
    o Address the cultural knowledge gap and the absence of translators to facilitate appropriate translation and interpretation
    o Expand access to essential resources and consider ways to include cross-cultural considerations in assessment procedures
- *Municipal governments*:
    o Encourage funding and support for extra-curricular activities such as 'dugsi' and soccer programs. Fund more and provide alternative programming for girls.

Youth Development

- Build on the leadership of the 1.5 and 2nd generation which is vital to providing mentorship to younger peers sharing similar experiences
- Invest in coalition support programs such as Pathways to Education

- Provide resources that facilitate skills development and networking opportunities at an early stage
- Invest in culturally and gender-specific youth support in areas of mental health, post-traumatic stress and guidance on how to negotiate identities of conflicting cultures
- Inform youth on post-graduate education opportunities including FSWEP, Co-operative education and studying abroad
- Encourage a focus on youth-led initiatives and youth involvement in decision making in community programming

"Cashberta:"

Migration Experiences of Somali-Canadian Second Generation Youth in Canada

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July 29, 2011

A Major Paper submitted to the Faculty of Environmental Studies
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in Environmental Studies,
York University Ontario, Canada.

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Abstract

My paper examines the circumstances that have pushed Somali-Canadian male youth from Toronto to Alberta; a region with a growing and booming economy. Once in Alberta, Somali youth are caught in situations where many are unable to work in their professional fields, or are unemployed and underemployed due to lack of skills and education. Without employment, some of these Somali youths have ended up in criminal activities—ultimately leading to their death.

This paper is grounded in the migration, settlement and integration of the Somali diaspora of Canada throughout the 1990s to the present, with an emphasis on the difficult integration and settlement experience of Somali-Canadian youth. It seeks to better understand the experiences of Somali families, specifically Somali families from the Greater Toronto Area, and the barriers they have faced in their process of relocation from Somalia to Canada. Further, this paper emphasizes the experiences of Somali-Canadian second generation male youth who are impacted by the obstacles their immigrant families face upon arrival in Toronto, and how that has hindered their integration into mainstream Canada such as in the labour market, the education system and their experiences with discrimination and other systemic barriers. These families face literacy problems and therefore cannot provide necessary educational support to their children at home. They face employment barriers and housing conditions in areas that are sometimes prone to violence, and consequently do not possess the requisite political skills to assist their children in navigating the various institutions that they must interact with such as the schools, security, policing and judicial systems. All of these challenges have affected Somali youth leading to their own difficult experiences in Canada.

I anticipate that this paper will add onto the paucity of research on second generation immigrant youth, specifically the experiences of Somali-Canadian males in Toronto, and the struggles they face every day, such as acute discrimination due to their race, skin color and religion, and their origins from an immigrant household usually situated in low income neighbourhoods in the Greater Toronto Area.

Foreword

This paper aligns with and thoroughly expands on my plan of study entitled "Barriers to Somali refugee adaptation in Toronto", by providing valuable evidence regarding the integration challenges faced by the Somali community in Canada in general, and Somali-Canadian male youth in particular. Furthermore, the research explores their personal experiences with regards to education, employment and discrimination which fall under two components: 1) local barriers to settlement and integration and 2) the experiences of Somali-Canadian second generation male youth in Ontario and Alberta. This fulfills the aforementioned objectives of investigating and examining the various barriers experienced by this specific demographic. The paper accomplishes this by conducting contemporary research on the local experiences of Somali male youth with the goal of developing new initiatives and improve existing settlement services in Somali led community organizations.

Acknowledgements

Looking back on the last two years, many people come to mind who have contributed to the completion of this paper. I wish to acknowledge my first academic advisor, Howard Daugherty who passed away and could not see this paper come to fruition. He gave me support during the preliminary days of this research—always cheering me up when times became stressful. Since then, I have had Ravi De Costa as my academic advisor—someone whom I am thankful to for his thoughtful feedback, constructive criticism and helping me shape my plan of study.

I would be remiss if I did not mention the valuable contribution of my supervisor, Liette Gilbert for her care, guidance, support and thoughtful feedback from the initial to the final level of this research. I have learned tremendously about the various facets and methodologies of research and especially with respect to current research topics on immigration and settlement. This paper would not have come to completion if it were not for my taking part in her course on Plurality and Planning. I am grateful and could not have wished for a better or more compassionate supervisor.

I would like to express my heartfelt thanks to my best friends; my parents- Fatuma Farah and Abdurahman Hosh Jibril for their prayers, encouragement, emotional support and sincere advice throughout my years of schooling. Despite their own struggles as immigrants they have encouraged me to always realize my full potential and beat the very system that has distressed them and other racial minorities who faced similar challenges in Canada. Certainly, I would have not been able to come this far without their support and I will forever be obliged to them. I wish to thank my family and friends who were there for me throughout this journey when I needed support, feedback and time to unwind from all the stress from school. I appreciate you all!

Finally, I would like to humbly express my appreciation to all of the participants in this research. Through this study, I have met community leaders who were toiling day in and day out assisting youth and families in integration and settlement matters—sometimes such simple matters as filling out application forms for housing or health insurance or disability claims forms. I also met dedicated parents, many of them single mothers struggling to raise six or more children. Some of my research participants are still grieving the loss of their children who were

murdered in Alberta or in Toronto. Yet although the majority of these parents, youth and community leaders are baffled by these tragic murders, almost all of them are nevertheless grateful to be living in Canada, as many of them could have still been in Somalia, a place that is still in the grip of civil and religious wars. Thank you to the Somali families, community leaders and youth who have generously allowed me to listen to their voices. I am appreciative for their efforts in opening up to me, trusting me and sharing their personal experiences with me.

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Dedication

I dedicate this paper to all the Somali families who have lost their loved ones to senseless
violence and to all the immigrant youth who are trying to integrate into Canada despite the odds.
I hope that my research contributes to the ongoing debate and public conversation on
immigration, integration, multiculturalism and settlement issues.

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INTRODUCTION

In this study, I first examine the settlement challenges facing the Somali community from an immigrant perspective. Li (2003) gives an in-depth analysis on the historical phases and evolution of immigration policies into the emergence of 'visible minorities' in Canada after the changes were made to the immigration policies in 1967. One of the salient features of the history of our immigration policies has been the systemic discrimination faced by newcomers when arriving to host countries. Li (2003) also points out how well immigrants do in their host society depends not only on their social features but it has a lot to do with the ideological preference and predisposition of the dominant White settler society (Europeans). In order for this dominance to take shape, the White settler society constructs an "us "versus "others" differentiation. So while the dominant society defends the moral characteristics of high ethical values, wealth, education and fluency in the official language, the immigrants are constructed as "others" and then become marginalized (Li, 2003). But what about those second generation Canadian citizens who are entrenched in Canada with a birth certificate or raised in Canada like some of the young men in this study but are still faced with barriers on the basis of race, religion, gender and settlement challenges in the family structure? Indubitably, this "otherness" of immigrant parents transcends onto Somali-Canadian youth who are not quite the "other" but not quite "Canadian" either. They are not privileged to deconstruct and control the concept of who is and who is not an immigrant and this is due to racial difference which for many years has contributed to the debate of immigration. Certainly, racism and inequality is still rooted in Canadian immigration policies (Bannerji, 2000).

The examination of social exclusion, stratification and inequality is a fundamental framework that guides this study and is used to emphasize the systemic racist inequalities that have affected the young Somali community. Galabuzi (2006) and Bannerji (2000) have articulated that non-white communities have been otherized. Galabuzi (2006:174-176) suggests that social exclusion is not the opposite of social inclusion because the latter was created as a top-down policy framework. Instead, social exclusion tackles the root causes of systemic approaches that have and still continue to marginalize groups of new immigrants and second generation youth. For example, there is racism that stems from colonization and slavery as well as the everyday struggles in discriminatory labour market (on the basis of Canadian experience),

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the use of language categorization such as "visible minority", legal challenges involving immigrant and family reunification, educational system, all which Bannerji (2000) contends represent the "the dark side of multiculturalism" of our times. The anti-racist framework outlined by Banneriji (2000) is well-suited for exploring the experiences of racialized youth. Banneriji (2000) examines the Canadian policies and points to the fact that official multiculturalism is designed to serve the interest of the ruling elites while playing lip service to diversity. It is a sanitized multiculturalism that only views differences through the celebrations of cultures such as Caribana, Diwali and Eid festivals for the benefits of the aesthetics but conveniently ignores the larger issue of economic and social equality. In other words, the high rate of unemployment, the rate of high school dropouts among certain immigrant youth, the concentration of certain immigrant families in inner city "ghetto's" remain unexamined so long as we continue to celebrate together during these "ethnic" celebrations. Consequently, this suffocation refers to the ghettoization of non-white minority communities who consist of new immigrants and other minorities who are otherized not only by race but also because of lack of commonality with mainstream society who often create hubs for themselves and engage in voluntary isolation in so called "ethnic enclaves" due to the lack of inclusion. Galabuzi (2006:181) also outlines more recent patterns of exclusion: "post-September 9/11, Canadian citizenship increasingly defined by place of origin, lack of representation in political institutions, contact with criminal justice system, neighbourhood selection, exposure to various forms of violence, poor health status and racialization of poverty".

While immigrant communities such as the Somali community face challenges due to systemic approaches to integration, their low levels of social and cultural capital has a role to play in their settlement. Thus, the social and cultural capital framework is explored in this study to illustrate why many Somali families faced challenges with integration upon arrival in Toronto aside from the systemic discrimination. The concept of social capital has been articulated by Pierre Bourdieu (1977) as economic, social and cultural resources that can advance underprivileged communities forward in society. Robert Putnam (2000) defines social capital as trust, social networks and social values of a community. More recently, James (2010) states that cultural capital is the economic, political or educational attainment that parents can pass on to their children in order to be successful in society. For the Somali community, many of them

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came to Canada with little or no social capital and educational attainment to pass on to their children because of their pre-migration context and unplanned migration journey.

From Somalia to Alberta

In the early 1990's, Canada and the United States became a safe haven for Somali refugees who were fleeing the conflicts and dangers of the civil war. Evidently, Toronto, with its highly praised multicultural reputation became a popular place of settlement for many Somali immigrant families who were looking not only for safety but also for a place that would provide their children with better opportunities. While there has been some research concerning first generation Somalis and the obstacles that they face in order to integrate into Canadian society, the impact that their transitioning experiences has on second generation Somalis is often overlooked. Reitz and Somerville (2004) argue that the experiences of first generation immigrants and their offsprings are distinct because of initial settlement challenges not experienced by the second generation. For example, while fluency in the English language is a major barrier for the first generation, it is not a problem for the second generation population as most of them are born and raised in Canada and thus are fluent in English.

However, second generation population may still experience longer term challenges of integration because of systemic barriers and racial discrimination which in turn lead to feelings of not belonging to mainstream Canadian society (Galabuzi 2001, Hall and Carter 2006). It seems that the experiences and barriers of first generation Somalis has created a rippling effect. Because of the various forms of discrimination faced by their parents, some Somali second generation youth have difficulties integrating, often feeling that they do not fit into the school or education system and becoming participants of criminal activities.

In the recent years, this societal dislocation led many Somali male youth from Toronto to leave their homes, families, and educational goals and expectations to move to the well-paying jobs in the Alberta oil boom. Sadly, in a period of five years, thirty-five Somali male youth have been killed in Alberta, leaving the Toronto Somali community dismayed and searching for answers. Although there is no factual evidence, both Alberta and Toronto news assume that the murders are gang and drugs related. Why have these Somali youth left the homes and lives that their immigrant parents have struggled to build? This is a pressing issue that I wish to explore.

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This paper aims to assess the experiences of Somali families who have migrated from Somalia after the civil war, the integration barriers they have faced and the recent migration trend of Somali-Canadian second generation male youth to Alberta's oil industry. The intent of this paper is to engage with the Somali immigrant community on the experiences of second generation male youth. My overall goal is to make these murder cases more visible to the larger Canadian society. I trust that by uncovering the narratives of why many of these young men have migrated to Alberta, the Somali community at large and the other Canadians will understand the sensitivity of the challenges facing these youth. In the end, I anticipate that the data collected in this research will support service providers in understanding the complex situations of Somali-Canadian male youth so that they may plan for appropriate services accordingly.

Research Questions

My research argues that integration problems for Somali male youth are 1) related to the larger integration challenges faced by the Somali community in Canada; and 2) that the current educational and employment systems have failed some of these youth who in turn have become disenfranchised and lured into the economic promises of *'Cashberta'*, the local vernacular term used by the Somali male youth to depict Alberta as a place of riches and instant cash. My exploration into this topic is organized around three complementary sets of research questions:

1) What are the barriers for Somali refugee families in Toronto and how has that affected the family structure at home?

2) What are the challenges experienced by Somali second generation male youth with respect to Toronto's labour market and/or education system? What are the effects of systemic racism due to their categorization of "visible minority"?

3) What does *"Cashberta"* mean for the Somali youth community? What are the motivations for young Somali males to migrate to Alberta for employment and what are some of the employment challenges faced by these male youths?

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Methodology

This study was approached from a qualitative research methodology which allowed for the utilization of semi-structured interviews of the complex issues facing the Somali community. Neuman (2011:175) identified qualitative data as significant because researchers attempt to "borrow ideas and viewpoints from the people we study and situate them in a fluid natural setting" instead of converting "fluid, active social life into variables or numbers". Therefore, by observing and recording what participants have said, this method gave me the opportunity to better understand the migration experiences of Somali families, the support and services provided to assist them by Somali community leaders and the everyday realities and challenges of some of the young Somali-Canadian males. It also allowed immigrant families and youth to express their personal experiences and perspectives openly on salient issues.

Participants in this study were recruited through snowball sampling technique as well as through networks' and community organizations. I conducted a total of 11 individual semi-structured interviews from January 2011 to April 2011. Three of these were with Somali community leaders by phone and via email (in Alberta and Toronto). Three Somali families who have lost their sons to violent murders in Alberta were interviewed face-to-face and on the phone in Toronto. Finally, five Somali-Canadian male youth (ages 17-29) were interviewed face-to-face (three in Toronto) and on the phone (two in Alberta). Interviews that were in person took place in participant's homes, schools, and organizations and/or in a coffee shop. Interviews lasted approximately thirty minutes with Somali families and Somali youth. Interviews time ranged from forty to an hour long with Somali community leaders because of other issues that arose in the conversation (i.e. recommendations and information about services provided to Somali families). All conversations were taped recorded, and I jotted down important notes during conversations. All the questions from the questionnaires were posed to participants. A summary of the open-ended questions asked to each and every one of the subjects can be found in the appendix of this paper. Also, consent forms were given (in person or emailed) to participants and signed prior to the interview. Oral explanations and also translations were provided to Somali mothers whose first language was not English prior to the interview.

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All data was transcribed verbatim without correcting grammar or slang and were categorized into major themes and patterns. The data provided in this paper is an overview of what participants perceived to be the most difficult challenges of settlement and integration in metropolitan Toronto, and in Alberta for young Somali-Canadian males who have migrated there since the oil boom. All names of Somali families and youth used in this paper are pseudonyms to protect the identity of participants.

Research Limitations

This research had a small sample size to address the specific experiences of Somali-Canadian second generation male youth and their families. A much larger size would be needed to recognize and capture more accurately the challenges facing the young Somali community in Toronto and Alberta with respect to their racialization, education and unemployment or underemployment status. My selection of participants was not random; I accessed most of the participants through personal contacts, through Somali community organizations in Toronto and Alberta who referred me to potential participants. I also attended a community event where I made connections with Somali families and leaders who have been involved in the advocacy of this youth group. Therefore, it must be recognized that my background as a young Somali-Canadian female born in Canada with connections to the Somali community may have influenced how I recruited the participants and my interactions with them during processes. However, I was self-reflective throughout the study and was clear in the beginning of each interview with participants about the goal of the research and avoided speaking about my family experiences and assumptions of the issues facing the Somali community. I have transcribed and quoted the entire participants' responses verbatim before even writing down any of my own interpretations to avoid misrepresentation. I, however, faced some difficulties in recruiting participants at first. In the beginning of my selection processes, attempts were made to schedule interviews with Somali community leaders. One participant (Somali male leader) did not contact me back after we set up a telephone interview. Another participant (Somali male leader) did not return my call after leaving a voice mail explaining my research study. One male participant was reluctant to participate after receiving the consent form.

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The perplexing problem of interacting with authorities of power positions in the Somali community (i.e. Somali male community leaders) stood as a limitation for me as a researcher. After attending one of the Somali events I became aware of the subtle manner of the interaction with Somali male leaders. Power and privilege superseded the commonalities between the Somali organizers and me as it seemed they were more intrigued with the possible research of a young white Canadian journalist (whose study is on the same topic) than my aspirations of networking and understanding the phenomenon now plaguing our community. I was faced with power imbalance as a young Somali-Canadian female born in Canada even with cultural competency and a university degree. Maybe, this was due to the perception that someone who is from mainstream society can produce good research on issues facing the Somali community instead of a female insider like myself. Perhaps, it was this kind of interaction with authorities of power in the Somali community that de-esteemed young Somali males through rejection and power imbalance that I was now facing as a young Somali female. Thus, what can be recognized is internal racialization within the Somali community because of the systemic structures in society. I also believe that power and privilege within the Somali community is still defined by gender, a cultural trait that has been imported from Somalia, a country that is highly patriarchal. Nonetheless, I could see the genuineness in these community leaders' efforts to resolve these murders and the issues faced by the Somali community.

Another limitation as a researcher, as female and insider in the Somali community, was the issue of trust between the young Somali-Canadian male youth and me. Initially, participants were hesitant to share some of their experiences in Alberta due to my affiliation with a recognized university. However, assuring them that pseudonyms would be used for the study was helpful. Overall, the participants in this study were open to expressing their experiences of migration, settlement and challenges with integration during one-on-one interviews. The findings below represent themes and patterns that emerged throughout the interviews.

Interviewees' Characteristics

The interviews sample was restricted to Somali families, youth and leaders. Most of the respondents interviewed had come to Canada in the late 1980s and 1990s after the civil war and early 2000s.

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- Some of the families and youth interviewed migrated to neighbouring countries typically Saudi Arabia and Egypt prior to coming to Canada. Others migrated to countries like Kenya, Italy and the United States before relocating to metropolitan Toronto.

- Of the three mothers interviewed, two were leading single-earner families raising three or more children. The exception was one woman who was married at the time of the interview.

- Most of them considered unemployment amongst them and their youth to be a barrier in their integration and settlement, a fact they associated with low levels of education and discrimination in the host country.

- Furthermore, all three of the mothers interviewed lost their sons to violent murders in Alberta after heading west to find employment.

- Among the five youth interviewed, three came back to Toronto from Alberta after migrating there and residing there since 2006. The remaining two were living in Alberta during the time of the interview and were originally from Ottawa and Toronto.

- The educational levels of the majority of the youth interviewed were relatively low. Of these five youth, one completed a four year university degree and was working in his field of study during the time of the interview; one youth completed three years of university and took time off for financial reasons; two of the youths' highest level of education was high school while one youth drop out of high school at grade 11.

- The low level of the education of the majority of the youth clearly affected their employment prospects in Toronto and Alberta because, only one was working in his field; one was unemployed in Alberta; one was unemployed in Toronto after coming back from Alberta and two were working at the airport as a baggage handler and a screening security officer (positions that do not require much educational qualifications).

- All participants interviewed said they faced discrimination in the labour market both in Alberta and their home cities. Among the youth respondents, financial barrier and family responsibility was significant factors for their reasons for migrating to Alberta.

- What emerged from the interview data obtained from the Somali community leaders interviewed was their concern about proper integration and lack of adequate role models in the Somali community for the youth.

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- All community leaders believed that socio-economic characteristics of the Somali community (high poverty, unemployment status, language barriers, and lack of male support) has a huge effect on the Somali second generation male youth, a fact that may have led to their involvement in anti-social behaviour in Toronto and Alberta or to the religious radicalization of some youth.

Across all themes, all participants interviewed emphasized discrimination as a factor in the marginalization of the community on the basis of colour, gender, culture, and religion and felt that unemployment was a major issue which has led many of these youth to Alberta. Somali male youth are likely to face discrimination when interacting with police or the criminal justice system. Respondents also stressed that some Somali youth have ended up in situations in Alberta with no family support systems as many of them separated from their parents who have remained back in Ontario.

Mapping of the paper

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section will provide a brief overview of migration experiences of Somali refugees to Canada. It will review challenges of settlement and integration and how the Canadian government policies have affected the Somali refugee community. The second section focuses on the specific experiences of second generation Somali male youth originally in Toronto with respect to employment, education and systemic racism. The aim is to present the literature on challenges in the labour market, education and experiences with discrimination. This section will also look at the identity challenges of Somali-Canadian youth and at media representations of, and reactions to, the Somalis murdered in Alberta.

This third section concludes voices to the first and second generations of Somali involved directly or indirectly with the murders. Based on my interviews, the section gives voice to the Somali male youth, families and community. The conclusion and recommendation provided in this section must be seen as a preliminary and as starting points for further, detailed research on the experiences of Somali second generation male youth originally from Toronto in Alberta.

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1. MIGRATION EXPERIENCES OF SOMALI REFUGEES TO CANADA

 Somali refugees, who were at one point, middle class citizens of their country left Somalia in the midst of war, persecution, and socio-economic devastation to settle in refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia or in host countries such as Canada. Soon after its independence in 1960, Somali military usurped power in a coup d'état in 1969 and turned the country into a twenty one year dictatorship that trampled the human rights of its citizens. When the military dictatorship of President Mohamed Siyad Barre was overthrown by Somali rebels in 1991, the rebels turned against each other and turned the country into a blood bath that killed thousands, starved thousands, displaced millions and destroyed all the country's infrastructure and institutions. From the late 1980s to the 1990s, Somali refugees fled to Europe and North America by the thousands because the country became controlled by warlords who turned against each other for power and resources. Once the civil war spread to the entire country, many Somalis spent years in refugee camps before relocating to host countries (Scott 2001, Opoku-Dapaah 1995).

As a result of the civil war, major governmental institutions such as healthcare and education were destroyed and Somalia's societal and governmental infrastructure was ruined. Consequently, destabilization and unsteadiness in Somalia resulted in many Somali resources being shattered, leaving struggling families with severely eroded social, cultural and economic capital. James (2010) articulates that cultural capital is the economic, political or educational attainment that parents can pass on to their children so that they may have opportunities in society. Murdie and Texeira (2000) found that Somali immigrant groups and refugees who arrived in Canada had very limited financial resources upon arrival and therefore could not afford their own homes. The socio-economic disadvantage of Somali immigrants is also discussed by Danso (2001) who concludes that Somali families were particularly disadvantaged due to the unplanned migration caused by the civil war. To support this claim, Danso (2001) compares and contrasts Ethiopian refugees with Somali refugees. Danso (2001) finds that the vast majority of Somalis arrived as refugee claimants seeking sanctuary in Canada as in-land applicants while Ethiopians were convention refugees and automatically given permanent residence. While both convention refugees and refugee claimants face barriers upon arrival, it is evident that by far, the situation of refugee claimants is far more insecure given long processes of

hearings and approval. Thus, Somali refugee claimants are in a poorer economic state in Canada

when compared to the Ethiopian convention refugees.

Particularities of Somali families

The lack of proper documentation and identification was another adversity for many Somali

families who sought sanctuary in Canada. Israelite et al. (1999) indicate that many Somalis left

quickly and therefore left behind all of their properties, including identification (i.e. passports,

birth certificates etc.) and certification of their credentials causing further delay in their asylum

application. And for those who managed to leave with some documents, the authenticity of their

papers was put into question by immigration officials. Since there was no longer any centralized

administration in Somalia during the civil war, Somali refugees could not ask for new documents

nor have their existing ones authenticated by Somali governmental agencies or diplomatic

embassies outside of Somalia (Israelite et al. 1999). Given that many Somali refugees could not

provide documents requested by Citizenship and Immigration Canada; the Canadian government

modified the immigration act which created a new group of refugees—those without identity

documents called the undocumented convention refugee in Canada class (Israelite et al. 1999).

The arrival of Somali families in Canada also coincided with large cutbacks of social

services by the Ontario Conservative government of the time (Israelite et al. 1999). These

cutbacks eroded social assistance payments, removal of rent controls, and other reductions in

services (Israelite et al. 1999). Social policy cutbacks created a particular burden for many

Somali women because many of their husbands were killed while fighting or several men were

forced to remain in Somalia while their wives and children fled the war (Scott, 2001). As a result

of this dislocation, many Somali women were left as single mothers who were entirely

responsible for their household upon arrival to host countries. Due to lack of a male figure, these

mothers also took on the role of the father for their children while coping with traumatic refugee

experiences and a number of settlement barriers (Israelite et al.1999). Studies have shown that

"Black" ethno-racial groups often live in one parent households mostly headed by a female, and

nearly all are destitute (Ornstein 2000, Anisef et al. 2010). For example, Ornstein (2000) found

that 46.8 percent of Somalis and 38.3 percent of the "Black" ethno-racial groups live in one

parent households. Findings also compare 32 percent of Ghanaians, and about 22 percent of

Eritrean and Ethiopians and 18.1 percent of Nigerians who are also female headed families (Ornstein 2000). Anisef et al. (2010) point out that there may be further deficiency in the social capital available to their offsprings residing in one parent families. In view of such family composition, children of immigrant families may be disadvantaged because single parents (on precarious income) might be unable to make essential resources available to them (Anisef et al. 2010). On the other hand, Tyyska (2006) observed that parental roles shifted and the relationships between parents and their children changed upon migration and settlement because of the lack of English fluency of the parents. As a result, parents can sometimes end up with limited control over their children's actions, especially during their adolescent years. Raising children in a very different society therefore joins the long list of challenges faced by Somali parents, already struggling with acquiring English language skills, finding affordable housing and employment (and in many cases, un- and underemployment) which all hinder their own integration as well as their second generation youth.

Settlement and Integration challenges of Somali refugees

Finding employment is a major struggle in many refugee and immigrant groups, even when they hold both educational and professional credentials in their country of origin. Various studies have shown that when immigrants first arrive, they often have to accept employment at a level below that of their education level or skills (Richmond, 2001). There is a lack of credit given to professional qualifications, credentials and training of visible minority immigrants in the job market in Canada (Danso, 2001). Many immigrants have been defacto de-skilled and excluded in the labour market. This is the case for many Somali immigrants, (predominately males) who are driving taxis in Toronto or are working menial jobs despite their high educational attainment. Danso (2001) reports that employment was a huge barrier in the initial stages of settlement for the Somali group with 22 percent in encountering employment in the job market, similar to many other newcomer groups. One Somali male respondent in Danso's research expressed his aggravation in the job market when he states: "What is so unique about this 'Canadian experience' every employer is always looking for?" (quoted in Danso 2001:10). The idea of being racially segregated in the job market clearly resonated with this Somali man. Recently, "Canada's color coded" study examined how skin color plays a role in accessing good jobs (Keung 2011). The findings illustrated that racialized or "visible" minorities are overrepresented

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in the "hard-hit light-manufacturing" sector with unstable low-paying jobs, and are underrepresented in the public administration sector (Keung 2011). In the latter sector, racialized minorities were underrepresented so much that 92 percent of workers are white which brings attention the obvious —those affected by systemic racism in Toronto are not part of policy development and implementation (Keung, 2011). Thus, racialized minorities are often stuck in unemployment due to the effects of systemic racism.

Danso (2001) and Opoku-Dapaah (1995) focus on the barriers Somalis face in the housing market. Danso (2001) findings show that 16 percent of the respondents had difficulties in securing affordable housing. Opoku-Dapaah (1995) recognized that many families lived in overcrowded apartments. A 1995 study concerning the housing of Polish, Jamaican and Somali immigrants indicates that each group had different barriers with regard to housing (Murdie et al. 2003). For instance, language was a barrier for Polish immigrants that arrived in Toronto while Jamaican immigrants faced a racial barrier in accessing housing. Predominantly White areas often resent the idea of immigrants moving in their neighbourhoods. For example, one participant in Murdie et al.'s housing study stated that, "in government housing, Metro housing…some neighbourhoods are easy to get in…affluent people [whites] move out…we move to areas without security, there is not recreational facilities…basically you are reduced to something that is less than acceptable for a human being" which demonstrates the discriminatory nature of home ownership and private/public rental arena (Murdie et al. 2003:7-8). Some landlords did not quite understand the culture and traditions of the large family size of Somali immigrants or outside family relatives coming in to stay with them. An average Somali family may have six or more children. Landlords are also not considerate of family sizes and so the number of Somali families in one apartment becomes a problem. The bottom line is that housing barrier is a common problem for large immigrant families who due to their lack of financial capabilities are forced to live in smaller apartment units (Murdie et al. 2003:10). As a result, many immigrant communities live in "immigrant enclaves" in areas where immigrants live together upon arrival in the host country for both economic and social reasons (Myles and Feng, 2004). The housing units in these "immigrant enclaves" are meant to be transitional housing for low-income families or new immigrants (James, 2010). However, in actuality, families are fixed in these areas of public housing due to the high prices and limited options of Toronto's housing

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market. Myles and Feng (2004) state that Blacks live in the most deprived neighbourhoods, which consist of largely small populations of Blacks from non-English speaking countries (e.g., Somalia). Moreover, Myles and Feng's (2004: 10) research findings prove that "Black families tended to be younger, more likely to be single parents, less educated than South Asian and Chinese immigrants and reside in more ethnically and racially heterogeneous neighbourhoods."

Hidalgo (1997) proposes that shady elements such as drugs, violence and crimes are usually a result of the social conditions in the inner city low income neighbourhoods. Additionally, Hidalgo (1997) reports that families in low socio-economic areas recognize the negative influences of violence of certain neighbourhoods but continue to dwell in these areas perhaps because many lack the choice or necessary resources to relocate to a better neighbourhood. In the case of Somali refugees, many are located in Toronto's older suburbs of Etobicoke, North York and York (Murdie and Teixeira, 2000). Many live in high-rise buildings in the Dixon Road and Islington Avenue areas, or in high priority neighbourhoods (so designated by the City of Toronto for their levels of poverty) of Rexdale, and in high-rise complexes in the Jane and Finch corridors. All these areas are painted with the same media stigma —i.e. areas where immigrants crowd together and violence prevails. Lower socio-economic conditions tend to create breeding grounds for crimes and violence which results in high dropout rates of second generation youth in schools.

2. MIGRATING FROM TORONTO TO ALBERTA

A recent research entitled *"Early School living among immigrants in Toronto Secondary Schools"* acknowledges that age is an important factor in migration which determines students' academic performance (Anisef et al. 2010). The study defends that the younger the immigrant is at arrival, the better their academic performance becomes. Migration at a later age creates an increased risk for dropping out of high school because integration becomes more complex (Anisef et al. 2010: 7). Reitsma (2001), Israelite et al. (1999), Opoku-Dapaah (1995), and Scott (2001) all concurred about the particular traumas and struggles faced by Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean refugee youth in Toronto and have the way they are disadvantaged in the education system because many of these young immigrants had "checkered" education backgrounds as

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many were left in refugee camps or in the process of migrating after the civil war. Furthermore, Reitsma (2001) research confirms that Somali students in the education system are concerned with the representation given to them which affects their learning. Often times, they were mislabelled as "hyper-active" students or were "expelled quickly" (Reitsma, 2001:15). Research available from the Toronto District School Board and other sources illustrate that Somali youth have an alarming dropout rate in schools. According to a recent Board's report, Somali students have a 36.7 percent dropout rate, which is the second highest in Toronto after Portuguese students who have a 42.5 percent dropout rate (Brown, 2010).

Perhaps, the education system does not take into account the different learning experiences of second generation youth. James (2010) contends that the education curriculum and institution is based on a Eurocentric attitude that can sometimes further disadvantage immigrant, racialized and ethnicized students. Reitz and Somerville (2004) explain that racial bias and the representation of teachers is critical particularly since there is an under-representation of teachers of color that reflect the student body. Also, the same authors point out that there is a disconnection between immigrant parents and schools because the role of parents has been devalued in the education system and as a result parents are unaware when their children are streamed into non-academic programs. Consequently, since the knowledge of the parents is not utilized, the disconnection between the immigrant parents and their children increases (Reitz and Somerville, 2004). Additionally, in working class neighbourhoods, schools have installed surveillance cameras and hired hall monitors and/or security guards to watch over students. Therefore, Black youth are socially constructed in relation to the working class immigrant neighbourhood in which they inhabit, which in most cases are located in high priority, low income and crime infested areas (James 2010).

In spite of their lack of Canadian education, Somali parents continue to aspire for their children to obtain an education and do well in Canada. Reitz and Somerville (2004) notice that even when first generation immigrants experience systemic challenges and barriers, they still encourage their children about the significance of continuing their education in order to make something of themselves and their family. James (2010) argues that second generation youth can negotiate the system regardless of the challenges they might face in regards to race, class and gender because second generation youth can participate in the unequal education system with the

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support of their parents. Yosso (2005: 9-13) refers to various forms of capital that racialized communities can use to "survive and resist macro and micro-forms of oppression." Yosso (2005: 9-13) identifies aspirational capital as "the ability to hold onto hope in the face of structured inequality and often without the means to make such dreams a reality." According to Yosso (2005: 9-13), "aspirations are developed within social and familial context, often through linguistic storytelling and advice… that offer specific navigational goals and challenge oppressive conditions." However, James (2010) recognizes that such aspirations may be complex for students without the middle class cultural capital –as in the case of Somali second generation youth whose parents have come to Canada unintentionally and have struggled to find means of survival for their families.

Similar to their immigrant parents, second generation youth have difficulties with employment. A recent study titled "*Race, ethnicity, immigration and jobs: labour market access among Ghanaian and Somali youth in the Greater Toronto Area*" by Shaibu Ahmed Gariba (2009) looks at the experiences of Ghanaian and Somali youth in Toronto's labour market. Gariba's (2009) findings corroborate with Galabuzi's (2001) study that found race and ethnicity to be significant factor in the labour market access in Canada. In Gariba's (2009) study, a majority of the participants came from large immigrant households with incomes under the poverty line. Even with high school diplomas or university degrees, Somali male were unemployed. Furthermore, some of the parents of these youth were university graduates from Somalia without a job in Canada. A Somali male respondent wrote "I think high youth unemployment has something to do with our color. Employers don't tell you directly but you know it" (quoted in Gariba 2009: 225). Moreover, being Muslim appears to pose as an additional challenge for Somali male youth. Another respondent wrote "having a Muslim name and being a Black does not help you in finding a job… I think since 9/11 getting a job is becoming harder for Muslims (quoted in Gariba 2009: 226). Therefore, due to poverty and the lack of employment opportunities, many of the youth chose idleness which usually leads to a life of crime (Gariba, 2009).

Since unemployment is a significant barrier for the young Somali community, Alberta's economic boom in 2005 until present has attracted a large number of Somali families and their children. As a result, many Somalis have migrated west to take advantage of the various

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positions in the labour market in Edmonton, Fort McMurray and Calgary. In a 2007 needs assessment research, the Somali Canadian Education and Rural Development Organization (SCERDO) interviewed Somali families about their post-migration experiences to Alberta from Ontario. According to the survey, 83 percent of the interviewees were Canadian citizens, 15 percent of them were permanent residents and 6 percent were refugee claimants (Ahmed et al. 2007: 15). Most of the families migrated from Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia because of employment opportunities (85 percent), or to join their families (65 percent) in Alberta. Others mentioned that their reason for relocation was because of the Somali community that was already living in Alberta (Ahmed et al. 2007). Respondents from this research, however, indicated that they remain in "survival mode" because they have not been able to profit from the Alberta economy since many Somalis are underemployed. For example, CBC's Fifth Estate documentary titled *The life and death of Abdinasir Dirie* shed light on the stories of Somali youth who shared similar challenges of unemployment and racial discrimination upon arrival to Alberta. One youth in this documentary expressed his frustration as he told reporter Gillian Findlay that "there's always that stereotype that exist. If I call for a job just because I don't have an accent the woman would be like yes the opportunity is still open, come, but when they see me it's a totally different story, they'll tell me the job is filled" (quoted in Anderson, 2010). As a result of this discrimination and unemployment, many of the Somali youth that were interviewed in the SCERDO study stayed home and did not work nor did they go to school (Ahmed et al. 2007). Some of the youth dropped out of high school even before completing their diploma. For those that did complete their high school diploma, they did not earn the grades they needed in order to apply for post-secondary education and thus were left with little opportunity upon graduating. As a result, youth became prey to criminal activities that are associated with youth violence.

Black youth culture (identity and systemic racism)

Gariba (2009) explains that participants in his research had conflicting identities as most of them used several identities to define themselves. Puzzled by their newly acquired identity, Somali participants in Forman (2001) research suggested that in their place of birth, they may not be identified as "Black". Once in Canada, the offsprings of Somali families are not always conscious of the racial bias and the historical background of racism in their host countries that

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construct them as "the other". Forman (2001) suggests that Black identities are affiliated with hip hop culture and are therefore portrayed in the popular lyrics and videos of rap songs which usually illustrate gangster images, the use of guns, misogyny, coming from "the hood" or the "ghetto" which subsequently becomes accepted in the minds of the youth who are also racialized. Forman (2001) explains that these representations are significant for the Somali immigrant and refugee youth who are faced with low economic status, and raised in low priority neighbourhoods which are usually communities that consist largely of Black Canadian families. Forman (2001) also points out that the effects of cultural encounter with North American racial ladder are not only in the schools where policies undermine their opportunities, but also outside when Somali youth (in the Canadian schools) experience discrimination when they are approached by white police officers for no apparent reason. Forman's (2001) findings support Galabuzi's (2006) study which reports that Black youth are three times more likely to be stopped by police when compared to any other youth group in Canada. Black youth are also exposed to criminalization at earlier ages in their lives (Galabuzi, 2006). A 1999 survey by *The Toronto Star* reported that Blacks, both Caribbean and African community felt more discriminated against than any other group in the city. This survey revealed that racism is the main distress for 71 percent of the Blacks that were interviewed (Carey 1999). Therefore, it seems that racialized communities such as Somali refugee families and their second generation male youth are discriminated against based on their race and religion.

The literature reviewed in this section identifies a number of challenges that Somali families and their second generation youth face in metropolitan Toronto and now in Alberta. The literature reveals that immigrant families, especially racialized immigrants, face a plethora of barriers that make it difficult to integrate into the Canadian society. Somali immigrant families are underrepresented in the labour market and face discriminatory challenges in the housing sector. Second generation Somali male youth, coming from immigrant households in a low income economically depressed neighbourhood, identified to as "visible minorities" due to race, and face similar challenges because of their parents' unsuccessful integration and settlement challenges associated with the refugee determination process. Unsurprisingly, many Somali youth feel discriminated against because of their ethnicity, religion and skin color. Furthermore, barriers that have hindered the integration of these youth such as discrimination and

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unemployment in Toronto have motivated them to migrate to Alberta in hopes of economic prosperity. However, too many Somali male youth find the same challenges in securing a job upon arrival to Alberta.

Murders in Alberta

Young Somali-Canadian males have recently migrated to Alberta after moving out of their families' home in hopes of finding employment opportunities in Alberta. The reality is quite different. Over the past five years, 35 young Somali men either born or raised in Ontario were murdered in Alberta. Most of these cases remain unsolved as the Alberta law enforcement seems to still be collecting evidence. After the Alberta oil boom in 2005, many of these young Somali-Canadian men migrated to Edmonton, Calgary and Fort McMurray only to end up in criminal activities and eventual deaths. Sadly, a cemetery in Edmonton contains row after row of the bodies of these young men (according to CBC News). This tragic situation has been overwhelming for the Somali community, especially for the families who have lost their sons and brothers. Some mournfully have lost their only sons, while others lost the eldest son whom for many single mother families was considered "the man of the house".

Several of these youth moved to Alberta with their parents who previously faced an unemployment rate of 22 per cent in Toronto, the highest of any ethnic group (Aulakh, 2010). Upon arrival, the parents found high-paying jobs while their children were presumed to have been linked to criminal elements. It is believed that many of these youths were murdered because of these particular ties to crime. Unfortunately, some of them were merely at the wrong place at the wrong time, caught in crossfire or killed due to mistaken identity since many have common names such as *Mohamed, Ahmed, Abdi or Omar* (Aulakh, 2010).

Despite the astounding number of deaths that have occurred, the media has strangely reported or produced little outcry and awareness of the murders. It seems that the larger audience in mainstream society is still oblivious to these tragic cases and to the ongoing experiences of the Somali-Canadian male youth. While I was gathering research for the development of this paper, I have on many occasions seen startling looks—many expressing disbelief as they did not know any of these murders were occurring nor did they truly understand the issues facing the Somali-Canadian youth. It seems that the Canadian government and media establishments place little

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significance on the killings of these young Somali-Canadian men. As a consequence, media coverage of the murders has been quite sparse. However, if you compare the media exposure and uproar of the mainstream community about cases involving violent deaths of members of privileged groups, one would see that headlines are different, full coverage is given to the issue and law enforcement establishments make an effort to find the perpetrators of these horrible crimes. Viewed from this perspective it seems that violent deaths involving Somali-Canadian youth are being treated as an "immigrant" problem when in reality it is very much a Canadian one, as most of these young men were born and raised in Ontario. I would argue that a closer understanding of the experience of Somali-Canadian male youth is much warranted.

Ahmed Hussen, head of the Canadian Somali Congress, in an interview with CBC News stated that most of the victims had migrated from the Toronto area to northern Alberta in hopes of securing high-paying jobs in the booming oil and gas sector. Hussen, who spent about 10 weeks in Alberta in order to understand the complex situation that is facing the Somali-Canadian youth, states that "our people are no longer immigrants…they're Canadians who are having a difficult time integrating into the mainstream" (CBC News, 2010). Perhaps, the stories of young Somali-Canadian men and their families are also a reflection of a system that has failed them as integration is not a one-way process. Presently, there are no clear answers to these senseless deaths but what is evident is that many of the Somali-Canadian male youth who went out west for employment never made it back home creating much grief in the Somali-Canadian community.

According to the Edmonton Sun, out of those victims, 11 have been killed in 12 shootings in Northern Alberta since August 2008 (Roth, 2011). Many others have been imprisoned or wounded in violent activities. Nearly all of these young men were originally from Toronto and upon arrival to Alberta, some of these youth found themselves without formal employment opportunities and were attracted by the "easy" money of illicit activities involving crime – and ultimately leading to their deaths. Many families are struggling with the loss of their children, and are shocked and unable to understand why some of these youth have chosen the wrong path when their initial plans were to get legitimate jobs.

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Most of these murder cases remain unsolved. The media depicts almost all the cases as drug related without providing the context of why and how these youth ended up in a life of crime and eventual murders. The only salient feature the media provides is that these unsolved murders are all from the same ethnic background; from the Toronto area, and are second generation Canadians from an immigrant household. This commonality, however, does not explain to the public the challenges of integration and settlement that these youth and their families have experienced over the years and the governmental neglect of their settlement and integration needs. Only a handful of the murderers have been sentenced and many cases have been closed.

The stories are tragic. Hassan Mohammed Yusuf, 41, a father of seven was stabbed to death and then crammed in the trunk of his cab after picking up three customers. Yusuf migrated from Africa in the 1990s as a refugee and later sponsored his wife and children to Ontario before moving to Edmonton in 2004. According to CBC news (2010), Yusuf spoke five languages and held two university degrees in the field of science. Even with his impressive credentials, Yusuf was a taxi driver in Ottawa but was not getting enough hours to provide for his family, so he migrated to Edmonton without his family to continue the same job. He worked extra shifts and was saving up to have them join him in Edmonton in the spring of 2005. Sadly, Yusuf was killed before he could reunite with his wife and children. The perpetrators of this horrible crime, Deidre Renned Baptiste, 23, and Ronald Adrian Crane "Junior", 27, were found guilty of first-degree murder, unlawful confinement and robbery, and Blair Strongman "Scooter", 25, was found guilty of manslaughter. The media coverage of their sentencing included a mention that they were well known to the police (CBC News, 2010).

Mohamed Ali Ibrahim, 24, died from a single gunshot on August 30, 2008 on the Enoch reserve at River Cree Casino west of Edmonton. According to the Edmonton Sun, this murder was an *"execution style"* as Ibrahim was shot in the back of the head (Roth and Bocari, 2011). Ibrahim had been living in Edmonton for about a year before he was killed and his family was living in Toronto. Adam Michael Brown, 21, and Alexander Edward Colin Reid, 20, were both charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder with no possibility for parole for 17 years. Police have not revealed whether they consider Ibrahim's murder to be associated to the drug trade or other criminal activities (Roth and Bocari, 2011).

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Mohamed Farah Khalif, 20, was shot on April 26, 2009 at Hermitage Park and was said to be Edmonton's tenth homicide victim of the year. An Edmonton newspaper suggested that Khalif was kidnapped by two Somali-Canadian men, Abdikadir Mohamed Abdow, 22, and Mohamed Abdilla Awaleh, 36, who were both charged with first-degree murder along with robbery and kidnapping (Zabjek, 2011). Police said they responded to the scene after receiving information from the local Somali community. Mustafa Warsame, 26, is one of the few witnesses to testify in this homicide. Warsame, who was told to get into the car that morning along with Khalif, leaped into the nearby pound after Khalif was shot. He told the court, that earlier that day the two killers became hostile towards Khalif at Abdow's apartment. According to previous police reports, Warsame was taken to a hospital against his will because of supposed threat to his family and so his mental state was questioned (Zabjek, 2011). Here was a person who came forward to testify but was brushed away as being mentally incapable based on what could be baseless accusations.

Edmonton's first homicide victim of 2011 was Mohamud Mohamed Jama, 23, fatally shot in front of Papyrus Lounge downtown after celebrating New Years. Jama was married and his wife is expecting this June. He was free on bail and was awaiting his sentencing for stabbing a man in October 2007. Sources affirm that he was involved in the drug trade (CBC News, 2011). Another 26 year old man was wounded in the same occurrence that night and was hospitalized. Yet, no arrests have been made in Jama's death and police have no suspects.

More recently, Yusuf Abdirhim, a 20 year old Somali-Canadian was beaten to death by a group of young men (according to CBC News). Abdirhim was found unconscious in Edmonton on May 19, 2011 and died a few days later in the hospital. Abdi Ali, 30 years old, killed in Edmonton. According to CBC News Ali's "body was discovered face down in an alley with a large bloodstain that had soaked the back of his shirt". Witnesses reported hearing gunshots and screams during the time of the incident. Sadly, Ali was married and was a young father.

The latest homicide this year was 25-year-old Ahmed Ismail-Sheikh who was found unconscious and wounded from a fight that took place in Edmonton on July 15, 2011 (Cummins and Ibrahim, 2011). According to Edmonton Journal, Ismail-Sheikh moved from Toronto,

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Ontario this spring after he just completed his third year of University of Toronto in hopes of finding employment in Alberta.

The "no snitching" rule seems to be a code of silence reminiscent of the old *"cosa nostra"* mafia code. No one wants to be associated with the incidents that have occurred even if it means putting away killers who are capable of perpetuating these similar acts. The Edmonton police have assigned two community liaison officers to the city's gangs and drug squad. Sergeants Patrick Ruzage and Ken Smith, both Black men, have sought to create trust and rapport with the young Somali community by organizing soccer games. Despite their ongoing efforts, Smith (quoted in Aulakh, 2010) acknowledges that the youth are not stepping forward with information as he says, "people are terrified of being snitches and then getting targeted."

On the other hand, the Somali community is frustrated with police officials who constantly ask for only Somalis to step forward. Recently, following the death of Mohamed Mohamud Jama (in front of Papyrus Lounge), detective Bill Clark made a comment that offended the Somali community. According to an Edmonton newsprint article, Clark told the media on January 2, 2011 that there "are a number of people that witnessed it…it's a reasonably narrow group, but they know who they are…absolutely no cooperation" from witnesses (quoted in Sands, 2011). This comment upset the Somali community because Papyrus Lounge is an Ethiopian establishment and it seems that the police detective is grouping all East Africans together when in fact there was an array of East Africans celebrating that New Year. Officer Clark also added that the parents and community leaders were turning a blind eye to the criminal activities in the youth community and that many of the Somali-Canadian youth who have been killed since 2005 were known to the police (Sands, 2011). His comment generated a public response from Mohamed Accord, the president of the Edmonton's Alberta Somali Community Centre, and Ahmed Hussen, head of the Canadian Somali Congress. Shortly after, Edmonton's police chief apologized in writing to the Somali community and the apology was accepted by the president of the Somali-Canadian Cultural Society, Hassan Ali and Abdul Hussein of the Somaliland Cultural Association of Edmonton (Sands, 2011).

Later on, Mohamed Accord, president of the Edmonton's Alberta Somali Community Centre, explained in an interview that the murder circumstances are complex and certainly

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racism has a role to play. He stated that, "this community is going through a painful transition. It's like an airplane that's flying and we are trying to fix it at the same time" (quoted in Brunschot, 2011). He also discussed that although many Somali youths have witnessed the murder of Jama, they have yet to come forward as this murder took place on New Year's Eve, a night where most of them were drinking. However, Accord pointed out that drinking alcohol is forbidden for Muslims and thus a taboo in many Islamic cultures such as is the case with Somalis (in Brunschot, 2011). For this reason, many of these youths feel ashamed to come out and explain all of the details of what occurred that night. Accord also suggested that along with the "no snitching" code, many have not come forward due to their own involvements in criminal activities (Brunschot, 2011).

The Canadian Broadcast Corporation (CBC) has produced two documentaries on the Somali community. The first documentary titled '*A place called Dixon*' explored the tension between Somali refugees and long-time non-Somali residents, who were predominantly White. Dixon Road is an area located in Etobicoke, Toronto that it is often referred to as "little Mogadishu" in a reference to the capital of Somalia. This area has been populated mostly by immigrant groups from Africa and South Asia. Somali families who were living in the Dixon area in the late 1980's faced xenophobia from the Dixon Corporation homeowners. The CBC documentary discussed the xenophobic reactions of non-Somali residents against their Somali neighbours. Many homeowners complained and made racist, misinformed comments such as "the Somali community… [is] a tribal community…a tribal community should have not been dumped into a condominium corporation community. You don't mix oil and water". Somali communities were acutely portrayed in a negative light. Qualified as backward and violent immigrants, the racism led to surveillance and the hiring of security guards for safety purposes. Somali male teenagers were particularly scrutinized and made to feel like they were dangerous. The CBC documentary illustrates the attitudes of the dominant society towards the Somali immigrant group, their culture and religion. One of the security guard that was hired called his guard dog *Mohamed* referring to the last Prophet of Islam, which further exposes the intolerance and xenophobia of the Dixon Corporation's staff. Many years have passed and Somalis are still frequently portrayed in the same light; as recent immigrants, who come from a violent country and face challenges adapting to the Canadian life.

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A decade later, the second CBC documentary examines the death of Toronto's Abdinasir in an apartment in Fort McMurray on April 21 2010. The documentary entitled *"The life and death of Abdinasir Dirie"* aired on The Fifth Estate. The documentary focused on the story of Dirie but also documented the lives of other young Somali-Canadian male who left for Alberta's alleged lucrative job market. The association of Somalis and violence is highlighted in this documentary as well. The opening scene shows the shattered and debilitated infrastructure created by the ongoing civil war in Somalia, even though most Somali-Canadian youth have either no connection what so ever with the civil war or little or no memory of it. From a Somali perspective, this is peculiar as the documentary was supposed to be about young Somali-Canadian men who have died in the recent years, and who were either born or raised in Ontario and therefore have had no real connection to the physical Somalia. For these youth, Somalia was an abstraction and a reference point to where their parents came from. Like the CBC documentary *"A place called Dixon"*, the Fifth Estate documentary's emphasis on violence condemned the Somali community as violent immigrants.

Popular Somali-Canadian hip hop rapper/poet K'naan, also known as "The Dusty Foot Philosopher," joined in on the discussion of the troubles facing the Somali youth community. K'naan who grew up in the Dixon area described how he imagined Canada; a place of no war, with a fairly good standard of living, great culture and educational opportunities (in CBC News, 2010). Yet for K'naan, "these dreams are relative in Canada and do not always belong to everybody, especially if you are a Black immigrant with no means…when your parents don't come with a certain education or you don't come with wealth and you're running from war…you have nothing"(quoted in CBC News, 2010). As a young Somali man, K'naan struggled with the pain of losing close friends to violence, to deportation, or incarceration. The hip hop rapper/poet also admits that he has had challenges growing up as a Somali male youth, and sometimes had trouble with police officers as they raided his family's Jamestown house in Rexdale. In the same interview, K'naan stated that he was once even stopped while crossing into the Canada-United States border because he apparently looked "violent" (CBC News, 2010). This is a sad indication of the prevalence of racial profiling targeted at young Black males including Somali-Canadian youth.

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Overall, the cases of the 35 young Somali-Canadian men who have died in Alberta have received very limited coverage by mainstream media and therefore in public debates. The fact that the media overlook these deaths is the reason why I have specifically named some of the murder victims. Since 2005, few journalists have covered the stories and issues of young Somali-Canadians. Somali community leaders have advocated for justice but still no one has tied the whole problem together to try and understand the root causes that have led these youth to move to and die in Alberta. Moreover, what is particularly offensive to the Somali community is that some of the media stories are not documented correctly, names are constantly misspelled, facts such as timelines are incorrect and references and headlines are frequently misleading. Yet the words race and racism are almost always absent in these stories. The media give a preconceived notion of the issues affecting the young Somali community, where both the audiences and creators interpret and attach meaning, thus formulating the idea of race, stereotyping and misrepresentation.

Cultural theorist Van. Dijk (1992:89) explains everyday racism in the media 'elite discourse' by arguing that the prevalent discourse can be the most damaging discourse of denial because it continues to create the dominant white consensus. Therefore, when the larger audience reads headlines about the Somali youth community constantly associated with criminal activities, the general public attitudes of the Somalis inevitably become negative. Moreover, limited media coverage of many of the Somali deaths that have occurred in the past five years, focused on the murders as an abstract without providing any context about real personal accounts of the young Somali-Canadian community. As argued by Van Dijk (1992), limited and biased media information becomes the evidence that people accept as true.

The recent deaths of Somali-Canadian youth are a crucial and complex issue in the Somali community in Canada and therefore should be of great concern for the larger Canadian society. What is evident in media coverage but not directly highlighted is that young men went to Alberta either with their families or on their own with friends and were murdered. Upon arrival, a few landed legal jobs while some gained illegal money from selling drugs and taking part in other criminal activities. Most of the media does not provide enough background of Somali-Canadian male youth, the exception being an article in SEE Magazine entitled *'Edmonton's Somalis: a community in transition.'* What is revealed but again not emphasized is that most of

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these young men grew up in a single mother household because some of the Somali fathers died in the civil war, stayed back when their families migrated to host countries or have separated from their wives (Brunschot, 2011). Also, fathers like Hassan Mohammed Yusuf, moved to Alberta to work while his wife and children stayed back in Ontario.

Media coverage misses why and how we have failed these youth. We have failed these youth in formal and informal labour markets. As mentioned, according to TDSB data, Somali students have a high dropout rate in schools. Other research also shows that there is a lack of integration and settlement approaches available to these youth at a young age. Therefore, some of these youth are not receiving enough support, especially during crucial periods in their education because sometimes mothers are unable to speak English or are working long hours. Ultimately, a number of youth do not succeed in school possibly for that reason or because the curriculum does not apply to their realities. Even those who have completed a university degree are disheartened by the types of jobs they obtain. Take Mohamed Hersi, 25, as an example. His family immigrated to Canada when he was a child and he was arrested at Pearson International Airport in Toronto, on March 29, 2011 due to suspected involvement with Al Shabaab, a radical Islamist group in Somalia. Despite having a science degree from the University of Toronto, he worked as a security guard and lived in a rundown public housing unit with his widowed mother who had raised four children (cited in *Toronto Star*, 2011). It may be that these are the types of challenges that motivate Somali-Canadian men to go out west or get involved with illicit activities. But not shedding light or reporting partly on these realities reproduce the individual and structural racism faced by Somali-Canadians.

In Reaction to the Murders

Given the alarming number of deaths of young Somali-Canadian men, families have demanded justice. Community leaders and families organized *Journey for Justice* events in Winnipeg, Calgary, and Ottawa and other events are expected to be organized in Toronto in the coming months. The *Journey for Justice* event is a place where mothers have created the opportunity to have their voices heard about their experiences of losing their young sons.

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Participants have also included a few youth and a handful of fathers. The objective of this event was to enable more evidence into the community on what has been happening in Alberta over the past years which has created a violent atmosphere for some youth. The event was also to support and strengthen the voices of the families who have lost their young ones in Alberta over the past years and establish relationships with people outside of the Somali community with the quest for justice. Evidently, the event was successful as families received psychological support from their community. However, the event did not accomplish the goal of recruiting communities from outside to support these families. Only one young Canadian journalist female outside the community participated whose research interest is on the cases of these young Somali-Canadian male youth.

Journey for Justice, Ottawa 2011   Image by Somali-Canadian Amin Amir

The organizers of the event Mohamed Accord and Ahmed Hussen have frequently represented the families in media, providing context and background of the Somali-Canadian experience in Canada. Though it is positive to have leaders who have made connections with police authorities and government officials to speak about these cases and the challenges of the Somali community; a question of representation arises with having two older male voices

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articulate on behalf of the Somali community, especially the youth. That the Somali community cannot speak with one voice due to their unique differences (i.e. migration patterns, family dynamics, youth culture, complexities of gender etc.) remains a major concern that mothers have attempted to expose during the *Journey for Justice* event.

Meanwhile in Alberta, the provincial government recognizes the problem and has granted $1.9 million in May 2010 to support community organizations that assist the Somali community in Alberta. $1.3 million of this serves for a "wrap-around programming" that will assist new Canadians integrate into mainstream society. In addition to that programming, the Alberta government will spend $400,000 on mentoring programs and $202,000 to offer educational support and after-school programs for Somali-Canadian youth (CTV News, 2010). According to Alberta Justice Minister Alison Redford, funding for after-school and mentoring programs is intended to keep youth out of gangs and occupy their time with positive activities (in Iltan, 2010). Representatives from the Somali community, however, feel that this support is too little and, too late. They demanded a public inquiry by all levels of government to find out why these youth are being killed, why most of the perpetrators of the crimes have not been apprehended, and what the root causes of all these criminal activities are, instead of creating bandage solution programs. The frustrations of the Somali community is well expressed by Mohamed Accord who feels that money will not help the problem at hand now because "[I]t's a medicine that they're prescribing but they don't even know what the disease is" (quoted in Iltan, 2010). Therefore, the Somali community has advocated for Alberta to create a government led taskforce to investigate the murders of Somali-Canadian young men. This proposal was said to be modeled after a taskforce investigation in Manitoba in August 2009 to probe cases of missing and murdered Aboriginal women in that province (Ogilvie, 2010). The Alberta Minister of Justice rejected the suggestion of a taskforce as being too time consuming and too costly (in Wingrove, 2010).

3. VOICES FROM SOMALI FIRST AND SECOND GENERATIONS

My interviews sought to better understand how the Somali community was coping with the murders of young Somali men, and the experiences of other second generation young males. In

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order to better understand the experiences of the second generation in Alberta, I needed to understand the experiences of the first generation and how they were coping with their youth leaving and dying in Alberta.

Voices from First Generation Somali

Interviews with first generation Somali revealed a consistent response as to why Somali migrated to Canada. The majority of the Somali families, many headed by females, migrated to Canada in the 1990's specifically because of the access to opportunities for their children and to live peacefully. This commonality can be related to the civil war in Somalia that forced some of the families to migrate to neighbouring countries. The following excerpts illustrate this point:

> *I came to Toronto for a better life and for my kids to be better than me (Farhia, single mother).*

> *I came for a better and safe life and future of my children...education, health, everything. I wanted them to be educated, go to university, help themselves, and help me and their countries (referring to both Somalia and Canada). If someone is educated anywhere he can work with their skills, you have future but if you don't have knowledge you are nothing...you work in labour (Amina, single mother).*

Parents interviewed did not have a high educational background which resulted in lower levels of economic resources. Though this community came to Canada in hopes of opportunity, my interviews reveal that this ethnic group faces financial, employment and language barriers, resides in economically depressed neighbourhoods in the GTA, and are now facing the effects of tragic deaths of their sons and other young Somali male youth in the community who were either born or raised in Canada.

Many Somali families are headed by females —mostly single mothers whose husbands were killed in the civil war or who stayed behind while their wives and children relocated (Scott 2001). However, other families have separated in Canada due to personal reasons which have resulted in continuing challenges in the family structure for these single mothers entirely responsible for the household, and who have to raise children in the west without father figures.

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When participants were asked about the challenges they faced, their answers revealed relevant factors that may affect the immigrant family structure at home. For example, one mother stated:

> *Difficult language, no work, if you are newcomer it's hard. You miss your family back home. Also if your single mother it's hard. When I came here, I was single mother with four kids... it's hard to raise four kids (Amina).*

Similarly, another participant expressed the difficulties of being a single mother when she said:

> *It's difficult, like I'm mom alone, children different school, age, grades... I was facing a lot of things but we survive it (Farhia).*

Not only are these mothers committed to financially supporting their children who they hope to integrate but they also value education and try to stay involved in their children's schooling in a number of ways. However, one participant explained her frustration as a single mother working long hours, when she was asked about her involvement in her children's education. Her response was:

> *Library, homework, tutor…but when I was working my first son he dropped out of school, so when I quit my job my three children, one graduated from high school and the other two will this year and want to go to university. But when come from work tired, it's so hard to go these places (Amina).*

Amina then revealed that her first oldest son who dropped out of school was murdered after he moved out to Alberta. One other participant explained that her status as a single mother raising six children (all born and raised in Canada) affected her children as they faced differential treatment in public schools which would not have happened had their father been involved in their education. Even when she continued to be an active parent, attending all of her children's school meetings, school officials streamed her children into non-academic courses such as English as Second Language (ESL). She opined:

> *I communicate with my children all the time but one day they said, mom we in ESL class, they put us in ESL class. When I find out I went to school, I said "don't put my kids there". They said your child English is not very good... but they born here. Some Somali students they go in ESL classes and don't know when they have exam for other class, so they dropout after and parents don't know (Farhia).*

A classic pigeonholing of students from marginalized and poor families is operationalized here. Despite being Canadian citizens, born and raised in Canada, some Somali students are streamed

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into non-academic courses based on their race, culture and the fact that they come from an immigrant household. Furthermore, this streamlining confirms Reitz and Sommerville's (2004) argument that the roles of immigrant parents are devalued in the school system. As a result parents are unaware when their children are streamed. However, the respondent mentioned above demonstrated a keen awareness of what was going on in her children's education because of communication with them and also because unlike Amina, Farhia at that time was self-employed and was selling cultural items in her own basement and was involved in her children's education. It is evident here that the disconnect between parents and youth increases in situations where single mothers are forced to be away from home for long hours so that they can provide for their children. For example, Amina further explained,

> *I went to work to survive. What my children did I did not know because at work and then you lose your children. What is going on outside environment we don't know because not the same culture, here and back home, different society (Amina).*

Other comments about the family structure emerged in the interviews with Somali community leaders who strongly agreed that the immigrant family structure at home effects the youth. For example, leaders explained that there is a lot of poverty in the Somali family units which then limits the social mobility of Somali-Canadian youth. Furthermore, leaders mentioned how the roles of the parents and children shift once in Canada and how their level of poverty is also related to their financial contribution to loved ones back home. The following comments indicate some of these issues:

> *Power shift at home because parents who are head of the household become handicapped by the challenges they face (for example language skills). The children pick up the language first. Also parents' skills are not recognized and parents' concern is having a roof over the head becomes a priority. Parents then work long hours and are absent from children, not because they intend to but due to work. The kids encounter the Canadian culture first and do not get enough support and dissociate with the family. Not being supported by family and perhaps they are going in potential hazard- gangs, drug dealing, and recruitment at this stage (Mohamed Accord, Alberta Somali Community Centre).*

> *The parents are still dealing with the tragedy that is still existing back home in Somalia...they tend to assist their loved ones back home. They still want to be with their loved ones and if they were to bring them here it is hard because of frustrations with immigration bureaucracy. So...when you have your mother or father dealing with that and you see them as a child your parents depressed, it affects you psychologically,*

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mentally and eventually affects you physically (Abdifatah Warsame, Center for Youth Development and Mentoring Services).

Somali community leaders in different interview sessions also felt that systemic racism was working against the Somali community, especially the youth. The leaders reflected on the prevalence of discriminatory attitudes in Canada, whether in the labour market and the education system. Leaders noted:

> *We are still categorized as Somali, Somali, Somali just like the Jamaicans. Still, I see racism within the system and until the system changes its going to be very difficult. (Abdifatah Warsame, Center for Youth Development and Mentoring Services).*

> *There is racism of low expectation from mainstream community for example in schools they tell you go here, to this subject etc. They identify them [32 Somali boys] with culture first, "Somali" but others are not referred to as "British" or "Ukraine" (Mohamed Accord, Alberta Somali Community Centre).*

A significant observation here is that, in spite of being in Canada for some time and the children of these parents entrenched in the Canadian culture, all respondents suggested that they were discriminated against both in their home city Toronto as well as in Alberta. In three cases, Somali mothers shared their experiences or the experiences of their children of discrimination. Overall, the majority of interviewees reported that they felt discriminated against on the basis of skin color, ethnicity, religion, gender and the fact that they are categorized as visible minority immigrants in Canada. As one mother sad:

> *Yes, for sure. In schools, teachers, getting pulled over... my son use to get pulled over by cops all the time because he was Black, young, male. (Fartun)*

Another participant mentioned that she and her family felt discrimination even in London, Ontario, prior to moving to Toronto and then in Alberta. Her response suggested that discrimination is more prevalent in London and Alberta than in Toronto as she said:

> *I used to live in Edmonton, different than Ontario. Big discrimination like look for a job. I worked in a factory, that place Indian, Cambodian, Ethiopian use to work with me. I quit because it's hard time for me. Even in London Ontario, I use to live there I never find a job. I apply. I use to volunteer to get future job but always who get the job? Someone who is not me. I have experience but its color (Farhia).*

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Another participant who came to Canada in the 2000's mentioned that she only felt discrimination after the death of her son, as she said:

> *That time I didn't face any discrimination but now I feel it because I see my children... my son was innocent and nobody helped me. Wrong time, wrong place (Amina).*

One mother further noted that the media discriminates against Somalis and portrays them negatively. She went on to explain:

> *Media, they lie about us...make some innocent boys look like criminal (Farhia).*

Perhaps, after seeing subjective media, some members of the Somali community question their identity and where they belong in Canada. Both Galabauzi (2006) and van Dijk (1992) agree that the media as an institution with its own logic can create images of certain groups which become the realities of racial minorities. As Galabuzi (2006:198) points out, these racialized groups are portrayed as invisible in the media when it comes to success; however they are often overrepresented in crime cases like the cases of these young Somali-Canadian men. Like Farhia expressed, those Somali youth who have passed away have been lumped into one category — immigrant youth involved in the drug trade, thus this generalization leads into differential treatment of youth.

Voices of the Second Generation Somali

Study participants consider themselves Somali but they also defined themselves as Canadian since most of the youth were born outside of Somalia and for those who were, they have never been back to Somalia, much less to Africa. According to majority of the respondents, belonging to Canada entailed living and growing up in Canada. Furthermore, the participants felt at ease with both aspects of the Somali culture and the Canadian one. Yet there was a marked ambivalence about their identity as a result of having to negotiate between different cultures. Adam, for example said,

> *Yes, of course. Also Canadian, a part of me is...I grew up here, it's what I know the most. I do feel that I belong to society...I don't have any problems with anyone. I fit in sometimes and sometimes stereotyped.*

Two other youth described their identities as Somali. For instance Abdinasir, stated:

I ... describe my identity as first Somali; basically I am Somali-Canadian. It always starts with Somali first though. I feel like obviously I belong to the Canadian society because I was raised here, I never went back home so pretty much...in a way I am part of the Canadian society.

However, it was Mohamed who gave a more different description as he said:

A year ago, I would say no, I am Canadian. I used to hide the fact I was Somali or African because I didn't see them as good people in society, and I mean that as no successful middle citizens class Somali families. No cops, no pilots, nothing to pride myself with. I didn't want to associate myself. The reason why I changed my train of thought is, growing up now... I've realized to see the struggles that my parents have gone through when they first came here not knowing the language, not knowing the culture, not knowing the people, the streets and how to adapt to the west; it was as though they were thrown in the middle of China not knowing the language and culture...you get what I am saying? That's what changed my train of thought to how Somali people are in the west.

Mohamed identified himself as Somali and also acknowledged and addressed the effects of immigration-related factors that have affected his parents like many other immigrants.

Many male youth in their interviews touched on some of the immigrant-related barriers that effect the family structure for the Somali community, for example, financial challenges, interaction with police officers because of the inner city neighbourhoods they resided in as both factors that motivated them to head to Alberta in the first place. One participant said:

In Toronto, we had no vehicle, we lived in government housing and we were in debt. Alhamdulillah (Thank Allah) when we moved to Edmonton we paid off our debts which were in the thousands (Mohamed).

He further explained his family's experience living in high priority neighbourhood in Jamestown, when he said:

In 2005 when we moved this was our lifestyle. Our house was getting raided in the 2005 Jamestown, Rexdale raid. Everyday interaction with police and this is not an environment that you want or your family to be in even though we weren't criminals we were being treated as criminals (Mohamed).

Unemployment among the Somali male youth is attributable to their lower levels of education. In this study, participants discussed their experiences with education and their reasons for not completing high school or university or for completing university degree and not being able to work in their home city. Some of the barriers that have affected the completion of high

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school and university were due to financial challenges, for example contributing to the family

household meant taking on full-time jobs with the intention of coming back to their studies.

Another participant took time off of university because of a financial predicament he got into

with Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP) and mentioned that he did not receive proper

information from the school he was attending which caused him to head to Alberta to save up for

his tuition. Participants noted:

> *I was a nerd back in the day, like throughout high school I was getting straight 80's…the reason why I dropped out wasn't cause like I was trying to act cool or anything. I had an amazing job when I moved to Alberta. I was getting paid 22 bucks to walk dogs and it was very stupid of me to drop my education to have this full time job but when all I seen was money, money, money and I don't know growing up in government housing and not having a lot of money…when I was introduced to that job and making a lot of money like close to 3-4 thousand dollars a month…that's a lot for a 17 year old…so I was just like Alhamdulillah (Thank Allah) screw this school, I'll continue it later but little did I know that you're gonna get lazy and I am not gonna go back (Mohamed).*

> *I was in school and then I stopped receiving student loans so in that case if you don't receive student loans you have to figure out another means of paying for school. I dropped a certain amount of courses and then they said if you drop this amount of courses (and I had no idea about that) it meant I would not receive any student loans. I did not know this information. I found out last minute. So the idea of Alberta came up and my brother was already out there, living there so he's the one who basically told me to come live with him (Abdinasir).*

Two out of the five participants shared their goal plans of pursing trades such as electrical

foreman and electrician. One out of the five said that he would go back to finish his university

degree once he has earned enough money to pay off his tuition and one participant who

completed his degree explained that he was not looking to further his education with a master's

degree or PhD but rather was looking for certificate programs that would give him more practical

skills in the workforce. In general, they all believed education or pursing some sort of

professional skills to be important for their future as one participant reported:

> *When you are in the work field you realize that the more education you get the higher you get paid, more wages you can earn (Abdinasir).*

However, one participant answer was evidence that some immigrant families have low levels of

economic resources and thus Somali-Canadian youth have responsibilities of also contributing to

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the household, especially when living with their single mothers. For example, Mohamed whose
highest level of education is grade 11 said:

> *As of now, I don't plan on it [going to school]. I work full-time, it's just me and my mom
> and two little kids (siblings) and you know I just help around the house, so I have no
> plans (Mohamed).*

 In addition to education barriers, employment opportunities in Toronto (as well as Ottawa as one
participant mentioned) seemed to be scarce and participants reported having difficulties landing a
job. Conversely, one youth noted that finding employment in Toronto was not a challenge;
however the jobs he was referring to were unstable labour jobs. Thus, it was clear from the
answers echoed that most of these youth migrated to Alberta under financial circumstances
because of unemployment in Toronto. One youth mentioned his frustration finding employment
in Toronto before and after he came back from Alberta. His response was:

> *In Toronto, I find it huge challenges of employment here cause I guess the population is
> so high here and there limited amount of jobs. It took me forever to just find a decent job.
> Like right now I work as a screening officer at Pearson airport. My whole time in
> Toronto I never really seen wages or pay cheques compared to what I am receiving right
> now (Abdinasir).*

Another youth who recently came back from Alberta reported:

> *Right now I am currently looking for a job and having hard time finding a job right here
> (Omar).*

One youth explained his challenges in finding employment in Ontario and Ottawa prior to
migrating to Alberta as he said:

> *Yes, had challenges finding employment due to lack of experience in the field. Ottawa is
> predominately French region, government, capital, so most jobs that are stable are
> government ones and they require you to speak French or have a lot of
> experiences...Took me a year to get a job, there are no entry level jobs...and no one
> would give me a chance (Ahmed)*

Mohamed however mentioned that he did not have difficulties in finding employment in Toronto
as he said:

> *I did not find no problems looking for a job... I must have just been lucky... I was working
> on and off labour jobs...but I did not find it difficult (Mohamed).*

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However, for many youth the experience with discrimination carries over with their migration to Alberta in the labour market, when interacting with their landlords, police officers and people who generalize Somali youth because of the deaths that have occurred over the past five years. One participant shared his experience with discrimination when he said:

> *Alberta is different, no urban culture. Urban culture is not big. You have to change your lingo, the way you dress; you have to be able to dress professional, differently in order to not get trapped into the stereotype. It kind of ruined us of being comfortable with our own style. If I see my landlord, I will dress a certain way just because that stereotype not on me. (Adam)*

One respondent said that in Alberta, he noticed discriminatory practices by employers and addressed it thus:

> *A lot of employers will see your skin color, Black, Muslim and 30% of the time they'll say "I don't need this person" based on race, religion. (Ahmed)*

Another respondent stated that,

> *There's a lot of racism, a lot of racism, that's what people don't mention that. There is a lot of Lebanese people and white people and they are very racist towards Somalis and we're looked down upon. (Mohamed)*

Mohamed further noted, perhaps the reason why some people discriminated against Somali youth was because they felt threatened that they were migrating to Alberta, *"to their areas, to their income, their whatever they felt they needed to protect"*.

Similarly, Abdinasir noted that in Alberta Somali youth are stereotyped because they looked a certain way, and automatically were assumed to be involved in the drug trade when random people would approach them. He stated:

> *I came out there and I was literally walking down the street, two different people came and asked me, asking if I'm selling, if basically I'm a drug dealer and they were basically looking for some stuff (Abdinasir).*

Harassment by police (both in Toronto and Alberta) is a common complaint for Somali male youth who feel that they are randomly searched, asked to provide identification and interrogated for no reason other than that ostensibly fit the description of a particular. For example, Adam felt that Somali males are being often times generalized as he said:

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The harassment from cops is as a result of what other Somalis have done, you get generalized because of what has happened in the past 3 years. Now more than ever before Somalis are getting more hated on because of the hype, the deaths, dark life style... they are hated on by the public (Adam).

Overall, participants' perception of racism and discrimination was negative and this was illustrated through experiences in varying ways, in the media, and interactions with people of authority such as police officers, in the education system and in the labour market which results in participants' difficulties in finding employment both in Toronto and now in Alberta.

Youth also suggested that some Somali youth they know were at one point involved with crime and therefore found it much more difficult to land a job once in Alberta. For example, one participant explained:

They were held back because they had previous charges. So those charges held them back from getting legitimate jobs. I do know one person whom I seen all the time he was struggling with his parole officer. Like all the time the parole officer used to check up on him and he used to tell him "I can't find a job, this place won't hire me". So... he still had to put food on the table.... pay for rent so he had no other choice but to join the drug trade and you can see personally he didn't really want to do it but it was basically his only means of survival. And that's not only him that happens to a lot of youth. Some of my friends like when they were younger they had charges. Now that they are older they really need to get legit jobs, it's like a step back, a lot harder for them (Abdinasir)

More directly another one adds:

A problem for relocation is finding jobs, I know that was a big one for Somali youth 'cause some had criminal records, umm... some weren't educated as well as they shoulda been (Mohamed).

The experiences of some of these youth and their perceptions remind us that to deliver some sort of reintegration program for youth who are engaged with criminal justice system is relevant to racialized working-class communities like the Somali-Canadian males, especially since most of the youth as one of the community leaders put it, "were charged with petty crimes, petty theft, and stupid crimes". Moreover, there seems to be a negative relationship between Somali youth and police officers which has resulted in some youth not coming forward with information that could be used as evidence in the event of crime incidents.

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Making Sense of 'Cashberta'

When study participants were asked why they and other young Somali-Canadian male were heading out west, their answers varied. Most of the mothers reported that unemployment in Toronto, interaction with police officers and discrimination in mainstream Canada were the main factors that pushed Somali youth out of Toronto. Somali youth expressed their financial difficulties in Toronto and explained that for some Somali youth peer pressure induces them to migrate as they have friends that had already migrated. Others suggested that it was a way to become autonomous and experience the world on their own. Somali community leaders however believe that migration to Alberta has been beneficial to some Somali youth who found meaningful jobs and careers there, while others have been lured into the drug trade which has led to eventual deaths of many youth. Below are some of the answers reported as to why these young men are leaving:

> *To make money. Easier to get job over there than here. Discrimination is also a reason in Toronto. When you are looking for a job, harder for Black male to find job than white guy (Fartun).*

A mother added,

> *First they are looking for a job, second when they are here every time they go outside... the police catch him, ask him information and most time they arrest them.... If police are outside driving and they see five white youth male they don't stop. But they see Somali or Black like Jamaican or African... they stop, check and investigate all the time. All our community youth, most are in jails, and others are in their grave... they are destroyed and nobody know reason. For example, my son only left here for three weeks and after three weeks the police came to my house and said we found your son's dead body. Over here there are no jobs... but they are drop outs, they don't have high school diploma, so they can't get work here so I think that's the reason why they are leaving. And over there they got jobs; most of them are labour jobs (Amina).*

With the exception of one youth, all of the Somali-Canadian males said that financial barrier and their families circumstances contributed to their migration to Alberta. One participant's main reason for moving out was because he wanted to use the skills gained from his university degree in a professional job. Consider the following examples:

> *My reasons and it's the same as other is all based on financial reasons. There is really no other reason for a person to go to Alberta. Any other aspect Alberta doesn't compare to Toronto. The only thing it beats Toronto by is the financial stand point. There's way more*

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employment out there, job opportunities and basically people are looking in the wrong place when they go out there (Abdinasir).

They go there because of financial situation, everybody in Toronto is having hard time finding a job over here and the wages is so much better in Alberta... plenty of opportunities over there that Alberta has that Toronto does not have, that's basically the reason why I went there. I had my sister there and her husband (Omar).

Independence...that's what everyone wants. A lot of Somali youth left Toronto so only way to leave is to convince your parents that you're going to work. A chance for them to explore the world themselves. Also to get jobs. Toronto is nice and all but you can't get nothing done, not a productive place (Adam).

For the same reason I migrated. We have...and I say this with all due respect we didn't have shit out here. We had no education, we had no money, we lived in government housing and if you were in this state, in mine and you were told that Alberta is the promise land, you can have a good job, you're gonna have a good life, small communities, government actually cares and lah lah and all of this, you would want a piece of that pie, you could so call it (Mohamed)

One of the interesting findings that emerged from the interview data was evidence that one Somali-Canadian youth despite systemic racism or the fact that he came to Canada at a young age from an immigrant parent, he landed a well-paying job in the technology and engineering field. This success was related to his educational qualifications which allowed him to gain upper mobility in the labour market in Alberta. Although Ahmed did not have the cultural capital like middle class mainstream members to assist him in negotiating the system, he certainly showed high aspirations and determination, so much that he held two employment positions,

I work as a field engineer at a medical company where I install x-ray equipment's and I also work at a shop, so yeah, two jobs (Ahmed).

Community leaders assert that there have been many successful Somali-Canadian youth after relocation to Alberta,

Many of our Somali youth in the community are succeeding despite the poverty, the drugs, the violence, and the areas in which they live...they are still making it (Abdifatah Warsame, Centre for Youth Development and Mentoring Services)

Alberta has been a mixed blessing. On the one hand, thousands of young and old Canadian Somalis have benefitted from legitimate jobs and opportunities.... On the other

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hand, it is undeniable that Alberta has become province where…Somalis have lost their precious lives (Ahmed Hussen, Canadian Somali Congress).

We can either deny the fact that youth are leaving to Alberta and be in denial and say there is job opportunity or tell it as it is. For sure there are a good number of youth who go for good reason—employment and education. And there's also another number of youth that goes to Alberta because of making easy money-the drug trade. So if a youth drops out of school and is headed there that means that youth is up to no good, there's gotta be a reason why he's going (Abdifatah Warsame, Centre for Youth Development and Mentoring Services

Over the last five years, the increase in the influx of Somali youth to Alberta has become trend. It appears that the majority of the youth have moved out west in search of economic opportunities given the fact that their employment prospect in Ontario was bleak. Unfortunately a number of them got lured into the criminal underworld as they did not have proper education and marketable skills. While some youth and families have profited from the Alberta economy, many have dropped out of school, ended up unemployed, got involved in criminal activities and sadly have been killed, sometimes due to mistaken identity or caught up by negative influence. When participants were asked about what the term "Cashberta" meant to them and what their perception of the latest trend was, there seemed to be a disconnection between some of the parent's response and the youth and leaders. For example, one mother answered,

What they know and we know is different (Farhia).

Another mother answered:

I never heard "Cashberta", first time I hear it now… first time. I think easy way getting money; youth go there, see other youth getting money, that or labour (Amina).

Male participants noted that "Cashberta" had two meanings. On one hand it was a place of riches where people could go to earn an honest living. On the other hand, some of the participants mentioned that the environment is a place that can sometimes lead Somali youth astray and get them involved with the drug trade and engaged in alcohol and the Alberta party scene. Interestingly, participants mentioned that although they grew up in some of Toronto's toughest neighbourhoods where violence and drugs took place, it was only until they moved to Alberta that they were exposed to this kind of life. Participants echoed:

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When I went out there every person that I chilled with had no parent figure out there, they had nobody out there. Nobody to tell them "yo, this is wrong, what you're doing is wrong, you gotta stop". Every night was like a party night for them. So they are not ready for what they are going out for, that's why they get deceived, that's where deception comes from (Abdinasir).

I left from Toronto a good kid. I went to Alberta, I had an amazing job, I was making amazing money but... I was hanging around the wrong crowd, bad friends... we were doing stupidness... cause everyone has money and you don't know what to do with it. It's not like here in Toronto where you have extracurricular activities... so you're gonna go to drugs, alcohol, you get what I'm saying? There's a lot of good that came out of it [cashberta] which was jobs, paid off our debts. There's a lot of bad that came out of it you know the deaths, seeing a bunch of friends jobless, they went into the drug trade. Me, myself I started arguing with my parents, I became a totally different human being. I remember I grew up in Jamestown, the worst neighbourhood in all of Toronto where shootings happened even in front of my house... I've never seen drugs, I only use to hear about these things that was going in my community. I went to Edmonton and this is where I first held a gun, seen drugs, tattooed my body... doesn't that shock you? When kids leave this bad environment in Toronto but they weren't exposed to this lifestyle but they go to other province and they are exposed....to me it was kinda bizarre. I thought it was going to be the promise land, the one that unites our family, takes us out of poverty... now looking back at and knowing what I know about Alberta... where people are just dying and families are being ruined and people are being introduced to drugs, guns and life of crime (Mohamed).

On the same theme, both mothers and Somali leaders suggested that the "Cashberta" trend was also a result of bad relationship between parents and their youth. This trend appeared to have an effect on the way Somali males interacted with their parents. Some of the following comments indicate that the "Cashberta" environment has ruined the immigrant family structure,

We have some bad Somali youth and some good one like every community but no respect for parents sometimes, back home part of our culture to respect and listen, and if you get kicked out they don't have no shelter, food but here they can get it anywhere. When you are 16 you get freedom and have right to leave your parents, you can't control your child. Government also controls how you raise your children here. When 16, 18 they can leave home and the proof is when they leave to Alberta where the money is easy money. And no family there to look at what you do. Back home it's different. (Amina)

One community leader shared a similar sentiment and his response was:

They address elders in a disrespectful manner (Mohamed Accord, Alberta Somali Community Centre).

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Participants' answers also revealed that some youth were/are impacted by the negative environment that surrounds them which affects the family. In Toronto, Somali parents sheltered their children from the negative activities in some of inner city neighbourhood often referred to as the "ghettos". However, some youth lacked the family structure in Alberta as Mohamed explained,

> *In Toronto we were more family oriented but in Alberta... everyone's working so there would be a good 3, 4, 5 days that I would never see my mom. She's working night shift, she's working another job in the morning... I was going to school in the morning and I was working full time at night and I couldn't handle it so I dropped out and went full time work. So, whenever I am at work, they are at home sleeping and whenever I am home and sleep they'd be at work. So, no interaction with family, that's where I think the problem started... then you turn to your friends, than this life comes you know (Mohamed).*

The common pattern that runs through all of these participants' responses is that the reason why they migrated to Alberta was predominantly due to financial barriers faced in Ontario; however they did not always foresee the challenges of unemployment, discrimination and the negative influences waiting for them in Alberta. Their descriptions suggested that it was a place of "deception" where they were exposed to shady elements that they have never experienced in Ontario. As illustrated, this is because most of the Somali male youth were without parental supervision once they arrived in Alberta.

Conclusion: Next Steps

The patterns and themes that emerged from the responses of participating youth, families and leaders demonstrated insight as well as variations, as to the challenges facing the Somali-Canadian community and the reasons why so many Somali male youth have left Ontario to find employment in Alberta. Findings show that first generation immigrant parents have come to Canada to build a better opportunity for their second generation children. This opportunity in most cases is linked to education and employment. Education in many of these families was believed to be the key to a successful integration and future. This was encouraged by parents who were unable to pursue their education and continue to face challenges with employment in Canada. Also, the responses of participants support the literature review of barriers facing the Somali community, such as low levels of social capital because of Somali families unintended migration journey and the fact that some families are headed by single mothers who reside in

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high priority neighbourhoods in the GTA and have had numerous experiences with discrimination on the basis of their skin color, culture, gender and immigrant status. All of these challenges seem to impact Somali male youth integration in Canada. However, financial barrier was reported as the common reason why many of them have left.

Second generation male youth identified themselves as Somali and felt they belonged to Canada. However, they still expressed feelings of racialization from the Toronto community. As illustrated, discrimination also continues to be a factor once Somali youth migrate to Alberta. This discrimination affects their interactions with landlords, police officers, mainstream society and employers. Interestingly, study participants revealed that it was only after leaving in Alberta that they engaged in shady activities because they confirmed that they lacked that family structure that sheltered them when they were living at home.

Community organizations in Toronto and Alberta have assisted numerous Somali-Canadian youth with regards to mentorship programs, afterschool programs, employment assistant programs and some settlement services for their families. Furthermore, they have engaged in Canadian media to promote positive image of the Somali community. More recently, the Edmonton's Somali-Canadian community launched several initiatives that will hopefully reduce the crime in the community. For example, counselling for at-risk youth and youth who are already in the criminal justice system. Also a poster campaign was created to encourage community members to submit information to police to help with murder investigations (Ibrahim, 2011). Still, the findings among the Somali leaders indicate that youth have difficulties integrating into mainstream society. According to Mohamed Accord of the Alberta Somali Community Centre,

> *Integration is a challenge. Lack of opportunity and acceptance from mainstream society. There are no programs for our youth (Somali youth who born here, or came at a young age). Resources and money available are not services in our interest but instead are associated with mainstream society. Programs such as recreational programs and afterschool programs, I call them path up solutions. Right now we are advocating on their behalf, we need to incorporate real issues into services.*

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Although change is difficult, the need of it is tremendous. Many respondents agree that change must come from the Somali community, especially the Somali-Canadian youth,

> *Youth need to accept responsibility. They need to understand the importance of education and aspire to continue their post-secondary education (Abdifatah Warsame, Centre for Youth Development and Mentoring Services).*

> *Youth need to accept ownership. They need to get involved in their country (both Canada and Somalia); it does not only belong to first generation but also to the second generation. Some of them think that it is not their responsibility, and they expect elders to take on the role like myself, but who will take on my role after? (Mohamed Accord, Alberta Somali Community Centre)*

Leadership and responsibility of the youth is significant in the progression of the Somali diaspora. But in order for such ownership and leadership to develop, the community needs some additional research and actions in order to alleviate the numerous integration barriers. Research about the Somali refugee experience is vital in the academic field as well as understanding of the cultural and socio-economic background of particular groups and the role of education in their lives in the pre-migration and post-migration context. More research is needed to further develop our knowledge of Somali-Canadian male youth and their experiences in the labour market, education, discrimination, and interaction with police officers in particular and settlement and integration challenges. As well, research on Somali-Canadian female youth and their experience during migration to Alberta would certainly contribute to the ongoing conversation within Canada about integration, immigration and multiculturalism.

Specific action/research is also needed to develop a crime prevention committee with Toronto police and Alberta police to improve the relationship between officers and urban youth in the inner city neighbourhoods of both cities. More mentorship programs where Somali youth have the opportunity to interact with progressive Somali young adults are also needed. Overall, a critical examination of the current settlement models of integration, and the extended role of Somali community organizations need evaluation and support, especially

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in regards to youth clients in order to perhaps develop new alternative models that better integrate or support Somali families and youth. To this end, it might be important to customize settlement models for immigrant families, like Somalis, that come flee from civil wars and from refugee camps that are already traumatized by the experience –especially as human and environmental devastations persist in Africa.

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Appendix I

List of those interviewed

Ahmed (2011). Phone interview with Sagal Jibril. January 31, 2011.

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Appendix II

Sample questions for respondents interviewed

Somali-Canadian Youth
Were you born in Somalia? If so, when did your family migrate to Canada?
How would you describe your identity (do you define your ethnic background as Somali)?
What is the highest level of education you have obtained? Do you have any specific trade skills within a profession?
Are you planning to pursue higher education? Why?
Do you have any challenges in finding employment in Toronto? Are you currently working?
What are the reasons (or what are your reasons) why many Somali male youth migrate to Alberta?
What motivated them/you to go there?
In what way has your financial situation impacted your decision to leave?
What have been the challenges of such relocation? Or what do you expect the challenges of relocation to be?

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Tell me about your experiences upon arrival to Alberta? What were the challenges you faced in finding employment in Toronto and Alberta?

What is your overall impression of *"Cashberta"*? What does *Cashberta* mean for you?

Overall, do you feel that you belong to the Canadian society?

Somali Families

Why did you choose to come to Toronto?

What are the challenges you faced with settlement in Canada?

Have you experienced any form of discrimination upon arrival? If so, explain.

What are the challenges you face and do you think the challenges you face affected your children? How?

Have you been active in your children's education (i.e. homework, parent-teacher interview etc)?

What are some reasons that have prevented you from being active in their education?

Have any of your children ever had 'problems' in or with school?

What are the opportunities who had hoped for your children in Canada?

Where do you access information and resources that you and your family need?

Why do you think your son /and/or many Somali male youth are leaving Toronto to Alberta?

What is your overall impression of *"Cashberta"*?

Representatives/Service Provides/Community Organizers

What is your role in the Somali community?

How have you assisted Somali refugee families and their children?

What do you think are the challenges faced by Somali second generation youth (male youth in particular)?

What are some examples of programs are in place to assist them with these challenges?

What barriers would you say is most common for youth in your community?

Do you think the immigrant family structure at home affect the youth? If so, in what way?

Why do you think youth are leaving to Alberta?

What are your concerns? What measures do you think need to be taken in this case of the Somali male youth?

What are the impacts of the recent wave of crime on the community?

What are the measures needed for youth?

What is your overall impression of *"Cashberta"*?

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ECONOMIC OUTCOMES OF GOVERNMENT-ASSISTED REFUGEES BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH (with additional highlights for refugees from Somalia)

SUMMARY:

- Analysis done based on the IMDB (Longitudinal Immigrant Database)[1] indicates that the economic outcomes of GARs (Government-Assisted Refugees)[2] landing in Canada have not changed much since the implementation of IRPA (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act) in 2002.[3]

- The findings from the IMDB show that the economic outcomes of GARs are among the poorest of all immigration categories and outcomes can differ by country of birth. GARs also have recorded the poorest economic outcomes among the other refugee categories examined (Privately Sponsored Refugees and Landed in Canada Refugees).

- The data indicate a notable improvement in outcomes with time spent in Canada – including higher average employment earnings, a higher incidence of employment earnings and a declining incidence of social assistance receipt.

- Economic outcomes of GARs from Somalia were at the lower end of the spectrum in the cross country comparison prior to the implementation of IRPA, but since the early 2000s Somali GARs have noted improvements in their economic outcomes and are now on par or slightly above that of the total GAR population.

BACKGROUND:

- Data from CIC's (Citizenship and Immigration Canada) permanent resident records indicate that landings of refugees have shifted considerably over the 1993-2009 period. During the pre-IRPA period (1993-2001), the majority of landings (close to 50%) originated from the former Yugoslavia[4], while more recently (2002-2009) a greater share of landings have

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[1] The source of the data used for this analysis was the "redesigned" IMDB (Longitudinal Immigrant Database), which combines CIC immigrant landing records with income tax returns. This updated data may differ from reports done in the past which used "legacy" IMDB data. For information on the IMDB, please refer to:
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/cgi
bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=5057&lang=en&db=imdb&adm=8&dis=2
[2] Government-Assisted Refugees refer to individuals who are selected abroad for resettlement to Canada as Convention refugees under IRPA or as members of the Convention Refugees Abroad Class, and who receive resettlement assistance from the federal government.
[3] Under IRPA, the resettlement program now focuses on selecting refugees most in need of protection and de-emphasizes the ability to establish. While having an ability to establish is still a requirement for most resettled refugees, Canada now selects more refugees who face specific settlement challenges and refugees who are vulnerable or in urgent need of protection are exempt from the ability to establish requirement. GARs are not required to have savings or assets upon arrival. In fact, they are exempt from inadmissibility for financial reasons and due to excessive demand on health or social services.
[4] Former Yugoslavia includes a number of different geographic codes which correspond to the changing geographic/geopolitical circumstances during the 1990s and 2000s. Specifically all landings from Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Montenegro, Republic of Serbia, Republic of Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Yugoslavia (former) have been grouped together.

originated from Colombia (roughly 20%) and Congo (6%). Note that a fairly constant flow has originated from Middle Eastern countries (Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan) throughout the entire time range (1993-2009). See tables A1, A2 in the Annex for more detail on landings by country of birth.

- o The number of GARs coming from Somalia has remained fairly low throughout the entire period examined. GARs from Somalia made up 2% of total GAR landings from 1993-2001 and 4% from 2002-2009.

- Some important socio-economic characteristics for GARs at time of landing are highlighted below and are presented in graphic form in the attached Annex (graphics A2-A5). These socio-economic characteristics can influence the economic performance of individuals.

- o More recent cohorts of GARs are relatively younger than cohorts who arrived in the 1990s. Roughly 60% of GARs who arrived during 2003-2009 were less than 24 years of age while the comparable figure during the 1990s was slightly less than 50%.

- o The gender mix has remained fairly stable with slightly more males (52% of total) than females (48% of total) landing as GARs. Recent trends point toward an equal share of females and males landing as compared to the 1990s.

- o The educational profile of GARs who were 20 years of age or older at time of landing changed during the 1993-2009 landing period. In general, GARs who landed during the 1990s were more likely than recent cohorts to have a university degree or a non-university and/or trade certificate (40% compared to 20%). In contrast, approximately 80% of recent (2002-2009) GAR landings had an education level of secondary school of less compared to roughly 60% of those landing during the 1990s.

- o Self-reported official language ability of GARs is limited, with an average of roughly 80% of all landings reporting "inadequate" ability in English and/or French.

- The socio-economic characteristics of Somali GARs are similar to that of overall GAR landings. However, Somali GARs generally have lower levels of education with roughly 95% of landings since the late 1990s having an education level of secondary school or less at time of landing.

KEY FINDINGS:

- Data examined[5] do not indicate any definite shifts in pre-and-post IRPA economic outcomes[6] for GARs. While the economic outcomes of cohorts who arrived under IRPA are at the lower end of the scale (especially for average employment earnings), the most significant recent

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[5] The IMDB data examined spanned from 1993 to the latest available information for 2009. Using this data, analysis was done on the economic outcomes of GARs by country of birth.

[6] Three measures of economic "outcomes" are used: average employment earnings, the incidence of employment earnings (percentage of tax-filing immigrants with earnings from employment) and the incidence of social assistance (percentage of immigrants receiving social assistance payments). Level differences in average employment earnings for this analysis differs from previous work done due to modifications to the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

deterioration in outcomes occurred prior to IRPA (pre-2002 landing cohorts). See table A3 in the Annex for detailed annual economic outcomes data on GARs.

- Average employment earnings for GARs increase considerably over time in Canada. In addition, the data show that the share of refugees reporting employment earnings also increases over time and the share reporting social assistance income decreases over time.

- The incidence of social assistance receipt (2 years after landing[7]) for GARs exhibits slight upward trend for post-2002 cohorts as compared to those who arrived during the late 1990s and into 2000. However, the highest incidence of social assistance was recorded for the cohort who arrived in 1993 (tax year 1995).

- The incidence of employment earnings (2 years after landing) remains around 60% for cohorts leading up to and after the implementation of IRPA. The highest incidence of employment earnings were recorded for GARs who landed in 1997-1998 (65% and 66%, respectively) while the lowest incidence were recorded for GARs who landed during 1993. The most recent data also indicates a drop-off in the incidence of employment earnings for the 2007 landing cohort (down to 49%).

- Data on employment earnings show that average entry employment earnings (2 years after landing) for GARs range from a high of $17,814 for the 1998 landing cohort (tax year 2000) to a low of $12,775 for the 2002 landing cohort (tax year 2004).[8] While employment earnings are at low levels for the most recent cohorts, the most significant drop in employment earnings occurred for the 2000 landing cohort (tax year 2002) – prior to the implementation of IRPA. Further, the drop in earnings is coincident with lower levels of educational attainment and a younger GAR population at landing.

- Graphics A6, A7 and A8 in the Annex detail economic outcomes 2 years after landing for GARs by key countries of birth. For this analysis, some of the recent top source countries were separated in order to get an idea of the prevailing trends with respect to economic outcomes.

  - The source countries specifically identified in this analysis include: Afghanistan, Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan.

- Generally speaking, the results show that GARs from Ethiopia and Sudan have better economic outcomes relative to other GARs, while the outcomes of those from the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan) have weaker outcomes. These country trends were also evident in an examination of economic outcomes of PSRs.

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[7] Due to the presence of the Refugee Assistance Program (RAP) usually during the initial 12 months after landing for GARs, it is felt that the most appropriate measure of initial economic outcomes for this category is 2 years after landing. This takes into account outcomes beyond the support period provided under RAP.
[8] Employment earnings figures have been adjusted for inflation using the CPI and are expressed in $2009.

- Outcomes of GARs from Somalia were at the lower end of the spectrum in the cross country comparison prior to the implementation of IRPA, but since the early 2000s Somali GARs have noted improvements in their economic outcomes.

  o Somali GARs consistently have had higher-than-average incidence of social assistance throughout the entire period examined, but the most recent data shows incidences which are more in line with that of the total GAR population.

  o Consistent with a high social assistance incidence, Somali GARs also note a low incidence of employment earnings throughout most of the years examined. However, the most recent cohorts (2003-2007 landing cohorts) are on par or slightly above that of the total GAR population.

  o One of the most surprising results in the cross-country comparison is the post-IRPA employment earning results for Somalia. While average employment earnings were well below the total GAR population during the pre-IRPA period, post-IRPA cohorts report average employment earnings well above that of total GARs.

- The most recent data for Somali GARs suggest some improvement in outcomes post-IRPA, but this particular group of refugees continue to have challenges entering the Canadian labour market as demonstrated by the higher-than-average incidence of social assistance. However, for those who do transition into employment, the most recent data suggests relatively good employment earnings as compared to all GARs.

ANALYSIS:

- It is important to note that many factors can contribute to the poor economic outcomes of refugees. Poor language skills, training and/or quality of education which is not suitable in Canada, lack of Canadian work experience, lack of informal networks can all play a role in the labour market. Other factors such as discrimination and family choices (e.g., caring for family members) are harder to measure, but can also greatly impact economic outcomes.

- Province/region of residence can also greatly influence economic outcomes due to differences in regional industrial composition and varying impacts of the business cycle on industrial make up.

4

Annex:
Graphic A1: Refugee – Landings (1993-2009)

Table A1: Government-Assisted Refugees – Landings by Top Countries of Birth (1993-2001)

Country of Birth	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	1993-2001 % of Total
Former Yugoslavia	1,158	4,189	5,637	4,913	4,101	4,275	4,033	4,974	2,396	49%
Democratic Republic of Sudan	110	48	45	99	511	508	466	849	888	9%
Iran	318	197	359	312	166	213	424	621	791	8%
Afghanistan	43	168	239	600	789	919	817	1,278	1,580	5%
Iraq	1,232	748	717	626	750	447	361	688	583	5%
Democratic Republic of Somalia	179	277	182	184	264	70	174	142	68	2%
Colombia	0	0	18	20	4	36	97	562	700	2%
Ethiopia	443	288	90	53	54	65	89	142	163	2%
Congo	33	33	44	145	69	59	90	243	360	1%
Other Counties	3,412	1,688	872	916	1,003	840	891	1,170	1,168	16%
Total	6,928	7,636	8,203	7,868	7,711	7,432	7,442	10,669	8,697	100%

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Table A2: Government-Assisted Refugees – Landings by Top Countries of Birth (2002-2009)

Country of Birth	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2002-2009 % of Total
Colombia	990	1,667	1,402	1,491	1,803	1,554	1,549	802	19%
Afghanistan	1,854	1,449	1,073	1,638	958	783	404	217	14%
Democratic Republic of Sudan	1,076	1,239	995	697	452	239	196	83	8%
Iraq	553	283	222	84	130	208	1,110	1,415	7%
Congo	260	372	472	413	456	562	601	683	6%
Iran	819	617	493	264	459	389	383	290	6%
Democratic Republic of Somalia	82	149	385	276	235	344	398	373	4%
Ethiopia	192	189	260	206	273	208	298	166	3%
Former Yugoslavia	537	93	67	51	62	140	115	63	2%
Other Counties	1,142	1,450	2,042	2,304	2,498	3,145	2,241	3,333	31%
Total	7,505	7,508	7,411	7,424	7,326	7,572	7,295	7,425	100%

Table A3: Government-Assisted Refugees – Economic Indicators (2 Years after Landing)

Land Year	Tax Year	Incidence of Social Assistance (%)	Incidence of Employment Earnings (%)	Average Employment Earnings ($2009)
1993	1995	57	46	14,998
1994	1996	50	52	16,026
1995	1997	45	57	16,046
1996	1998	43	60	16,166
1997	1999	43	65	16,711
1998	2000	39	66	17,814
1999	2001	39	63	16,296
2000	2002	43	57	13,840
2001	2003	44	55	12,958
2002	2004	47	56	12,775
2003	2005	49	56	13,448
2004	2006	50	59	13,524
2005	2007	47	55	13,956
2006	2008	47	57	15,372
2007	2009	49	49	13,946

Graphic A2: Government-Assisted Refugees – Landings by Age Group (% of Total GARs)

| 0 to 14 years of age | 15 to 24 years of age | 25 to 44 years of age |
| 45 to 64 years of age | 65 years of age or more |

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
Graphic A3: Government-Assisted Refugees – Landings by Gender (% of Total GARs)

Graphic A4: Government-Assisted Refugees (20 years of age and over) – Landings by Educational Attainment (% of Total GARs)

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
Graphic A5: Government-Assisted Refugees – Landings by Official Language Ability (% of Total GARs)

Graphic A6: Incidence of Social Assistance 2 Years After Landing (%) – GARs by Country of Birth* and Tax Year

Graphic A7: Incidence of Employment Earnings 2 Years After Landing (%) – GARs by Country of Birth* and Tax Year

Graphic A8: Average Employment Earnings 2 Years After Landing ($2009) – GARs by Country of Birth* and Tax Year

Graphic A9: Average Employment Earnings ($2009) – GARs by Years since Landing (YSL) and Tax Year

"YSL" – Years since Landing

"*" – Due to the limited number of observations in the IMDB for GARs, data quality is an issue for some countries of birth. This may result in large fluctuations in the observed trends due to small numbers of observations.

ECONOMIC OUTCOMES OF PRIVATELY SPONSORED REFUGEES BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH (with additional highlights for refugees from Somalia)

SUMMARY:

- Analysis using the IMDB (Longitudinal Immigrant Database)[1] indicates that the economic outcomes of PSRs (Privately Sponsored Refugees)[2] landing in Canada have been more positive since the implementation of IRPA (Immigration and Refugee Protection Act), in 2002, as compared to pre-IRPA cohorts.[3]

- Despite the recent improvements and a better performance relative to GARs (Government-Assisted Refugees) and LCRs (Landed in Canada Refugees), the economic outcomes of PSRs are among the poorest of all immigration categories and substantially weaker than the average of the Canadian population.

- The data indicate an improvement in outcomes with time spent in Canada – including rising employment earnings and a declining incidence of social assistance receipt.

- Generally speaking, the results indicate that PSRs from Somalia are consistently among the worst economic performers of the countries examined. Somali PSRs consistently have a higher-than-average incidence of social assistance and a lower-than-average incidence of employment earnings throughout the pre-and-post IRPA period examined. However, the most recent cohorts (since 2001) of Somali PSRs are showing some positive signs – with average employment earnings generally well above the level for all PSRs.

BACKGROUND:

- Landings of PSRs (graphic A1) make up a very small proportion of overall permanent resident landings and a relatively small share of refugee landings. From 1994-2009, PSRs have accounted for 1-2% of overall permanent resident landings and 12% of refugee landings. However, the share of PSRs in overall refugee landings has been on an upward trend since 2006 and by 2009 accounted for 22% of total refugee landings (a combination of an increase in PSR landings and lower landings of Landed in Canada Refugees).

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[1] The source of the data used for this analysis was the "redesigned" IMDB (Longitudinal Immigrant Database), which combines CIC immigrant landing records with income tax returns. This updated data may differ from reports done in the past which used "legacy" IMDB data. For information on the IMDB, please refer to:
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=5057&lang=en&db=imdb&adm=8&dis=2
[2] Privately sponsored refugees refer to individuals who are selected for resettlement in the Convention Refugees Abroad Class, the source country class or the country of asylum class and who are privately sponsored by organizations, individuals or groups of individuals.
[3] Under IRPA, the resettlement program now focuses on selecting refugees most in need of protection and de-emphasizes the ability to establish. While having an ability to establish is still a requirement for most resettled refugees, Canada now selects more refugees who face specific settlement challenges and refugees who are vulnerable or in urgent need of protection are exempt from the ability to establish requirement.

1

- PSRs landing in Canada come from many countries; top source countries have shifted somewhat over the 1993-2009 timeframe. During the pre-IRPA period (1993-2001), the largest share of landings (20%) came from the former Yugoslavia[4], while more recently (2002-2009) the greatest share of PSRs have originated from Afghanistan (23%). A larger share of post-IRPA PSRs have also come from Ethiopia (16%) and Sudan (5%). Note that a fairly constant flow originated from Iraq (roughly 15% to 21%) throughout the entire time range (1993-2009). See tables A1, A2 in the Annex for more detailed landings by country of birth.

  - The number of PSRs originating from Somalia has remained fairly low throughout the entire period examined. PSRs from Somalia made up 3% of total PSR landings in both the pre-IRPA (1993-2001) and post-IRPA (2002-2009) periods.

- Some important socio-economic characteristics for PSRs at time of landing are highlighted below and are presented in graphic form in the attached Annex (graphics A2-A5). These socio-economic characteristics can influence the economic performance of individuals.

  - The age profile of PSRs has remained relatively stable throughout the timeframe examined in this analysis. The largest share of landings are made up of individuals who are 25-44 years of age (at roughly 40% since 1995) followed by younger individuals who are between 0-14 years of age (25%-30%) and 15-24 years of age (20-25%).

  - The gender mix has remained fairly stable with more males (54% of total) than females (46% of total) landing as PSRs.

  - The educational profile of PSRs who were 20 years of age or older at time of landing changed during the 1993-2009 period. In general, PSRs who landed during the 1990s were more likely to have a university degree or a non-university diploma and/or trade certificate (35%) as compared to the post-IRPA recent cohorts (20%). In contrast, approximately 80% of recent (2002-2009) PSR landings had an education level of secondary school of less compared to roughly 65% of those landings during the 1990s. This trend is strikingly similar to that of GARs.

  - Self-reported official language ability of PSRs has also changed considerably over the 1993-2009 timeframe. The share of PSRs landings who had knowledge of an official language (almost entirely English) declined from roughly 50% in 1993 to 20% in 1996 and remained in that range until 2003. Since 2004, the share of PSR landings who reported knowledge of official languages has trended upwards – 40% of PSR landings in 2009 reported knowledge of an official language.

- There are some important differences in socio-economic characteristics to note when comparing Somali PSRs to all PSR landings.

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[4]Former Yugoslavia includes a number of different geographic codes which correspond to the changing geographic/geopolitical circumstances during the 1990s and 2000s. Specifically all landings from Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Montenegro, Republic of Serbia, Republic of Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Yugoslavia (former) have been grouped together.

2

    o   Somali PSRs generally have lower levels of education, with roughly 95% landing since the late 1990s having an education level of secondary school or less at time of landing as compared to roughly 75% for all PSRs.

    o   In addition, Somali PSRs are more likely to be male and younger in age than all PSRs.

KEY FINDINGS:

- Data examined[5] indicate generally positive results since the implementation of IRPA for PSRs[6]. The economic outcomes of cohorts who arrived under IRPA are better than those who arrived in the pre-IRPA period – specifically they have a higher incidence of employment earnings, a lower incidence of social assistance, and higher average employment earnings. See table A3 in the Annex for detailed annual economic outcomes data on PSRs.

- Average employment earnings for PSRs increase steadily with time in Canada. In addition, the share of PSRs reporting social assistance income decreases over time while the share reporting employment earnings remains fairly stable.

- The incidence of social assistance receipt (2 years after landing[7]) for PSRs is currently at low historical levels (19% during the 2009 tax year), the continuation of a downward trend established for cohorts arriving since the latter half of the 1990s. The highest incidence was recorded for the 1995 cohort (in tax year 1997) at 34%. Of note, the incidence of social assistance for PSRs is substantially lower than GARs with the gap now at 30 percentage points.

- The incidence of employment earnings (2 years after landing) for PSRs has trended upwards since the 1995 landing cohort and has also shown significant improvements since the implementation of IRPA. The IMDB data show the incidence at historical highs for the 2005-2006 landing cohorts (in tax year 2007-2008, respectively) – edging close to 80%. These results are consistent with the downward trend observed for social assistance over the same time period.

- The most recent IMDB landing cohort available for PSRs (2007) shows a drop in both the incidence of employment earnings (down to 70%) and average employment earnings, and a rise in the incidence of social assistance. One should take note that these movements coincide with the recession which started in 2009.

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[5] The IMDB data examined spanned from 1993 to 2009. Using this data, analysis was done on the economic outcomes of PSRs by country of birth.

[6] Three measures of economic "outcomes" are used: average employment earnings, the incidence of employment earnings (percentage of tax-filing immigrants with earnings from employment) and the incidence of social assistance (percentage of immigrants receiving social assistance payments). Level differences in average employment earnings for this analysis differs from previous work done due to modifications to the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

[7] In order to be consistent with previous economic outcomes analysis done on GARs, the incidence of social assistance is examined 2 years after landing.

- The incidence of employment earnings for PSRs recorded a few years after landing is very much dependent on the incidence recorded shortly after landing – that is the incidence demonstrates "stickiness" in either direction despite increased time since landing. This is different than that observed for GARs who demonstrate some upward movement in incidence post initial results.

- Data on employment earnings show that average employment earnings (2 years after landing) for PSRs range from a high of $22,243 for the 2006 landing cohort (tax year 2008) to a low of $17,301 for the 2002 landing cohort (tax year 2004).[8] For the most part, average employment earnings have noted strong, steady gains since the low for the 2002 cohort (with the only decline being noted for the 2007 landing cohort (2009 tax year).

- Graphics A6, A7 and A8 in the Annex detail economic outcomes 2 years after landing for the most common countries of birth for PSRs. For this analysis, some of the recent top source countries were separated in order to get an idea of the prevailing trends with respect to economic outcomes.

    o The source countries specifically identified in this analysis include: Afghanistan, Congo, Ethiopia, Iran Iraq, Somalia and Sudan.

- Generally speaking, the results show that PSRs from Ethiopia and Sudan have better economic outcomes relative to other PSRs while the outcomes of those from the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan) have weaker outcomes. These country trends were also evident in an examination of economic outcomes of GARs.

- Outcomes of PSRs from Somalia are at the lower end of the spectrum in the cross-country comparison.

    o Somali PSRs consistently have a higher-than-average incidence of social assistance and a lower-than-average incidence of employment earnings throughout the pre-and-post IRPA period examined.

    o However, the most recent cohorts (since 2001) of Somali PSRs are showing some positive signs – with average employment earnings generally well above the level for all PSRs.

- The most recent data for Somali PSRs suggest that this particular group of refugees continue to have challenges <u>entering</u> the Canadian labour market, but for those who are working the data suggest good outcomes relative to all PSRs.

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[8] Employment earnings figures have been adjusted for inflation using the CPI and are expressed in $2009.

4

ANALYSIS:

- Although showing signs of improvement in economic outcomes since the implementation of IRPA, the performance of PSRs continues to be among the weakest of all immigration categories and significantly weaker that the average of the Canadian population.

- It is important to note that many factors can contribute to the poor economic outcomes of refugees. Poor language skills, training and/or quality of education which is not suitable in Canada, lack of Canadian work experience, lack of informal networks can all play a role in the labour market. Other factors such as discrimination and family choices (e.g., caring for family members) are harder to measure, but can also greatly impact economic outcomes.

- Province/region of residence can also greatly influence economic outcomes due to differences in regional industrial composition and varying impacts of the business cycle on industrial make up.

Annex:

Graphic A1: Refugees – Landings (1993-2009)

Table A1: Privately Sponsored Refugees – Landings by Top Countries of Birth (1993-2001)

Country of Birth	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	1993-2001 % of Total
Former Yugoslavia	850	905	1,094	958	1,033	949	600	375	212	20%
Afghanistan	400	251	633	608	643	402	717	959	1,394	17%
Iraq	1,008	588	637	748	409	339	335	449	530	15%
Ethiopia	562	238	237	168	114	73	147	357	378	7%
Iran	456	120	72	71	39	69	51	38	80	3%
Democratic Republic of Somalia	221	85	135	118	65	53	48	62	86	3%
Democratic Republic of Sudan	33	19	18	24	25	39	27	90	125	1%
Colombia	32	0	0	0	0	5	15	30	120	1%
Congo	14	5	10	11	8	15	22	29	22	0%
Other Counties	6,923	1,302	710	483	406	323	386	544	629	34%
Total	10,499	3,513	3,546	3,189	2,742	2,267	2,348	2,933	3,576	100%

Table A2: Privately Sponsored Refugees – Landings by Top Countries of Birth (2002-2009)

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Country of Birth	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2002-2009 % of Total
Afghanistan	902	1,040	761	707	946	789	704	557	23%
Iraq	363	243	449	412	252	748	953	2,507	21%
Ethiopia	327	688	584	590	714	523	494	447	16%
Democratic Republic of Sudan	165	113	183	194	244	210	218	143	5%
Colombia	221	218	110	155	122	99	109	79	4%
Democratic Republic of Somalia	48	52	79	87	153	182	114	213	3%
Iran	91	108	147	77	65	94	43	46	2%
Congo	38	42	59	63	87	96	60	83	2%
Former Yugoslavia	89	32	11	2	6	2	2	0	1%
Other Counties	797	716	733	689	749	845	815	961	23%
Total	3,041	3,252	3,116	2,976	3,338	3,588	3,512	5,036	100%

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Table A3: Privately Sponsored Refugees – Economic Indicators (2 Years after Landing)

Land Year	Tax Year	Incidence of Social Assistance (%)	Incidence of Employment Earnings (%)	Average Employment Earnings ($2009)
1993	1995	30	66	17,911
1994	1996	28	65	17,934
1995	1997	34	58	17,920
1996	1998	30	61	19,238
1997	1999	26	68	20,451
1998	2000	20	71	20,607
1999	2001	20	71	18,927
2000	2002	19	74	18,074
2001	2003	20	70	17,663
2002	2004	21	70	17,301
2003	2005	20	76	18,605
2004	2006	19	75	20,124
2005	2007	19	77	22,226
2006	2008	17	77	22,243
2007	2009	19	70	19,600

Graphic A2: Privately Sponsored Refugees – Landings by Age Group (% of Total PSRs)

0 to 14 years of age   15 to 24 years of age   25 to 44 years of age

45 to 64 years of age   65 years of age or more

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
Graphic A3: Privately Sponsored Refugees – Landings by Gender (% of Total PSRs)

Graphic A4: Privately Sponsored Refugees (20 years of age and over) – Landings by Educational Attainment (% of Total PSRs)

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
Graphic A5: Privately Sponsored Refugees – Landings by Official Language Ability (% of Total PSRs)

Graphic A6: Incidence of Social Assistance 2 Years After Landing (%) – PSRs by Country of Birth and Tax Year*

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
Graphic A7: Incidence of Employment Earnings 2 Years After Landing (%) – PSRs by Country of Birth and Tax Year*

Graphic A8: Average Employment Earnings 2 Years After Landing ($2009) – PSRs by Country of Birth and Tax Year*

Graphic A9: Average Employment Earnings ($2009) – PSRs by Years since Landing (YSL) and Tax Year

"YSL" – Years since Landing

"*" – Due to the limited number of observations in the IMDB for PSRs, data quality is an issue for some countries of birth. This may result in large fluctuations in the observed trends due to small numbers of observations.

ECONOMIC OUTCOMES OF LANDED IN CANADA REFUGEES BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH (with additional highlights for refugees from Somalia)

SUMMARY:

- Analysis using the IMDB (Longitudinal Immigrant Database)[1] indicates that the economic outcomes of Landed in Canada Refugees (LCRs)[2] have been more positive since the implementation of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) in 2002.

- Despite a relatively better performance when compared to Government-Assisted Refugees (GARs), the economic outcomes of LCRs are generally weaker than those of Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs), are among the poorest of all immigration categories, and are weaker than the average of the Canadian population.

- The data indicate improvement in outcomes with time spent in Canada for LCRs, including rising incidence and levels of average employment earnings and a declining incidence of social assistance income.

- Generally speaking, the results from the IMDB indicate that LCRs from Somalia are consistently among the worst economic performers of the countries examined. A similar trend emerged when examining the economic outcomes of PSRs and GARs (to a lesser extent) from Somalia.

BACKGROUND:

- Landings of LCRs (roughly 12,000 per year since 1993, graphic A1) make up a small proportion of overall permanent resident landings but a relatively large share of refugee landings. Since 1993, LCRs have accounted for 5% of overall permanent resident landings, and 44% of refugee landings.

- During the 1993-2009 timeframe, LCRs came from many countries but for this analysis the focus is on select countries in order to be consistent with similar analysis done for GARs and PSRs. These select countries of birth include: Afghanistan, Colombia, Congo, Ethiopia, Former Yugoslavia[3], Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan.

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[1] The source of the data used for this analysis was the "redesigned" IMDB (Longitudinal Immigrant Database), which combines CIC immigrant landing records with income tax returns. This updated data may differ from reports done in the past which used "legacy" IMDB data. For information on the IMDB, please refer to: http://www.statcan.gc.ca/cgi-bin/imdb/p2SV.pl?Function=getSurvey&SDDS=5057&lang=en&db=imdb&adm=8&dis=2

[2] Landed in Canada Refugees refer to individuals who have had their refugee claims accepted and who subsequently applied for and were granted permanent resident status in Canada. With the introduction of IRPA, this group is referred to as "Protected persons in Canada".

[3] Former Yugoslavia includes a number of different geographic codes which correspond to the changing geographic/geopolitical circumstances during the 1990s and 2000s. Specifically all landings from Serbia and Montenegro, Republic of Montenegro, Republic of Serbia, Republic of Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Yugoslavia (former) have been grouped together.

- o During the pre-IRPA period (1993-2001), 8% of LCR landings came from Somalia; over the more recent period (2002-2009) this proportion has dropped to 3% of total LCRs.

- o In contrast, the share of those LCRs originating from Columbia was 1% during the 1993-2001 timeframe – this share rose to 12% during the 2002-2009 timeframe.

- o In contrast to that seen for GARs and PSRs, tables A1 and A2 indicate that roughly three out of every four LCRs come from "other countries" not specifically identified in the tables.[4] Other major source countries of LCRs in the 1993-2009 timeframe include: Sri Lanka, Pakistan, China and India.

- • Some important socio-economic characteristics for LCRs at time of landing are highlighted below and are presented in graphic form in the attached Annex (graphics A2-A5). These socio-economic characteristics can influence the economic performance of individuals.

  - o The age profile of LCRs has remained relatively stable throughout the timeframe examined in this analysis. The largest share of landings is made up of individuals who are 25-44 years of age (roughly 52% since 1993) followed by roughly equal shares of younger individuals who were 0-14 years of age (16%) and 15-24 years of age (17%) at time of landing. The most recent trends point to larger shares of LCRs landing in their later working years (45-64 years of age), the proportion of which rose steadily from 8% to 17% between 1993 and 2009.

  - o The gender mix has remained fairly stable over the period 1993-2009, with more males (57% of total) than females (43% of total) landing as LCRs. The most recent trends show the proportion of females has risen slightly, from 42% (during 1993-2001) to 46% (during 2002-2009).

  - o The educational profile of LCRs who were 20 years of age or older at time of landing changed only marginally during the 1993-2009 period. In general, LCRs who arrived during the 1990s were slightly less likely (15%) to have a university degree relative to those landing more recently, over 2002 to 2009 (18%). Approximately 61% of recent LCR landings (2002-2009 cohorts) had an education level of secondary school or less compared to roughly 65% of those landing during the 1990s. The proportion of those LCRs landing with a non-university diploma or trade certificate remained stable, at 20%, over the period (1993-2009).

  - o Self-reported official language ability of LCRs has changed over the 1993-2009 timeframe. The share of LCRs who reported knowledge of an official language increased from 87% in 1993 to 98% in 2009 (English, French or both official languages).

- • There are some important differences in socio-economic characteristics to note when comparing Somali LCRs to all LCR landings.

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[4] LCR landings vary considerably among countries of birth. For the purpose of this analysis, the source countries shown in Table A1 and A2 (Somalia, Iran, Congo, Afghanistan, Former Yugoslavia, Sudan, Iraq, Ethiopia, Colombia and "other countries") were consistent with the associated analysis done for GARs and PSRs.

- o The most notable difference is that Somali LCRs have lower levels of education at landing. Over the 1993 to 2001 period, 85% of Somali LCRs had secondary school or less (the comparable rate for total LCRs was 65%); this proportion rose to 95% among Somali LCRs who landed from 2002 to 2009 (the comparable rate for total LCRs was 61%).

- o In addition, Somali LCRs are more likely to be female and younger in age than all LCRs.

KEY FINDINGS:

- Data examined[5] seem to indicate generally improved economic outcomes[6] since the implementation of IRPA for LCRs with a lower incidence of social assistance, higher incidence of employment earnings and higher average employment earnings.

  - o Data from the IMDB indicate some weakening of economic outcomes for the most recent tax years, but one should also keep in mind that this coincides with weakening overall economic conditions during 2009.

- Average employment earnings for LCRs increase with time in Canada. In addition, the share of LCRs reporting social assistance payments decreases over time while the share reporting employment earnings remains fairly stable.

- The incidence of social assistance receipt (2 years after landing[7]) for LCRs hit an historical low (21%) for the 2005 landing cohort (tax year 2007), the continuation of a downward trend established for cohorts landing since the early 1990s. Social assistance receipt for subsequent cohorts has increased, reaching 26% for the 2007 cohort (tax year 2009). However, these incidences are substantially below the highest incidences which were recorded for the 1993 cohort at 53%. Of note, the incidence of social assistance for LCRs is higher than that of PSRs, but lower than that of GARs.

- The incidence of employment earnings (2 years after landing) for LCRs has trended upwards since the arrival of the 1993 landing cohort and this has continued for post-IRPA LCRs. The incidence of employment earnings for LCRs showed significant improvement since the implementation of IRPA despite some declines for the most recent cohorts (2006 and 2007).

- The incidence of employment earnings recorded a few years after landing is somewhat dependent on the incidence recorded shortly after landing – that is, although showing slight upward movement in incidences post initial results, the rates demonstrate some "stickiness"

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[5] The IMDB data examined spanned from 1993 to 2009. Using this data, analysis was done on the economic outcomes of LCRs by select countries of birth.

[6] Three measures of economic "outcomes" are used: average employment earnings, the incidence of employment earnings (percentage of tax-filing immigrants with earnings from employment) and the incidence of social assistance (percentage of immigrants receiving social assistance payments). Level differences in average employment earnings for this analysis differs from previous work done due to modifications to the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

[7] In order to be consistent with economic outcomes analysis done on GARs and PSRs, economic outcomes measures are examined 2 years after landing.

despite increased time since landing. This finding is more similar to PSRs who demonstrate strong "stickiness" in their incidence of employment earnings, than it is to GARs who demonstrate some upward movement in incidences post initial results.

- Data on employment earnings show that average employment earnings (2 years after landing) for LCRs range from a high of $21,706 for the 2005 landing cohort (tax year 2007) to a low of $16,616 for the 1993 landing cohort (tax year 1995).[8] While average employment earnings of LCRs are at relatively low levels compared to other immigration categories and the Canadian average (approximately $40,000 in 2009), LCRs have noted improvements post-IRPA (2002).

- Graphics A6, A7 and A8 in the Annex detail the economic outcomes 2 years after landing for selected source countries of birth for LCRs.

  o The source countries specifically identified in this analysis include: Afghanistan, Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan.

- Generally speaking, the results from the IMDB indicate that LCRs from Somalia are consistently among the worst economic performers of the countries examined. A similar trend emerged when examining the economic outcomes of PSRs and GARs (to a lesser extent) from Somalia.

  o Somali LCRs consistently have a high incidence of social assistance and a lower-than-average incidence of employment earnings throughout the pre-and post-IRPA period examined.

  o In addition, average employment earnings of Somali LCRs have been well below the average of all LCRs for successive cohorts from 1993-2005. However, average employment earnings for the most recent cohorts have been above the average of all LCRs which is a positive sign.

- The IMDB data examined suggest LCRs from Somalia have substantial challenges entering the Canadian labour market.

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[8] Employment earnings figures have been adjusted for inflation using the CPI and are expressed in $2009.

4

ANALYSIS:

- Although showing signs of improvement in economic outcomes post 2002, the performance of LCRs continues to be among the weakest of all immigration categories and weaker that the average of the Canadian population.

- It is important to note that many factors can contribute to the poor economic outcomes of refugees. Poor language skills, training and/or quality of education which is not suitable in Canada, lack of Canadian work experience, lack of informal networks can all play a role in the labour market. Other factors such as discrimination and family choices (e.g., caring for family members) are harder to measure, but can also greatly impact economic outcomes.

- Province/region of residence can also greatly influence economic outcomes due to differences in regional industrial composition and varying impacts of the business cycle on industrial make up.

- LCRs have a relatively better economic performance when compared to Government-Assisted Refugees (GARs), but outcomes generally below those of Privately Sponsored Refugees (PSRs). This is an interesting finding as there are reasons to think that LCRs should have the best economic outcomes of all refugees. This presumption is based on pre-landing time in Canada for claimants – which should allow LCRs to have a 'head start' on integrating into the Canadian labour market.

- The poor economic outcomes of Somali LCRs are a concern and further investigation is required to understand the sub-par performance.

  o When looking at these results from a broad perspective one must also take note of the underlying socio-economic characteristics of the Somali LCR population. Somali LCRs have lower levels of education at landing, are more likely to be female and are generally younger which all can play an impact on economic outcomes.

5

Annex:
Graphic A1: Refugees – Landings (1993-2009)

Legend: Landed in Canada Refugees — Refugees Total

Table A1: Landed in Canada Refugees – Landings by Select Countries of Birth (1993-2001)

Country of Birth	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	1993-2001 % of Total
Democratic Republic of Somalia	2,077	431	795	447	388	1,034	1,139	1,035	673	8%
Iran	728	397	845	1,203	1,304	1,012	837	669	474	7%
Congo	228	132	204	328	390	441	631	713	569	3%
Afghanistan	81	41	218	398	222	325	257	393	331	2%
Former Yugoslavia	198	272	341	333	191	196	246	243	170	2%
Democratic Republic of Sudan	253	164	223	291	255	166	121	151	189	2%
Iraq	175	117	130	180	184	143	223	142	146	1%
Ethiopia	229	95	94	126	102	127	111	124	103	1%
Colombia	15	14	27	27	26	25	52	195	426	1%
Other Counties	8,955	6,148	9,939	10,129	7,572	6,713	8,177	9,328	8,816	72%
Total	12,939	7,811	12,816	13,462	10,634	10,182	11,794	12,993	11,897	100%

Table A2: Landed in Canada Refugees – Landings by Select Countries of Birth (2002-2009)

Country of Birth	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2002-2009 % of Total
Colombia	479	751	1,222	3,044	2,790	1,481	937	1,103	12%
Congo	519	450	489	455	399	330	203	169	3%
Democratic Republic of Somalia	398	480	555	439	363	253	104	127	3%
Iran	385	371	351	327	337	270	161	130	2%
Afghanistan	255	179	257	182	183	157	105	177	2%
Ethiopia	79	91	136	281	280	198	127	96	1%
Iraq	124	105	157	199	147	111	57	119	1%
Democratic Republic of Sudan	149	197	201	138	67	41	37	19	1%
Former Yugoslavia	98	44	65	113	103	88	43	14	1%
Other Counties	8,060	8,596	12,468	14,757	11,215	8,767	5,220	5,252	75%
Total	10,546	11,264	15,901	19,935	15,884	11,696	6,994	7,206	100%

Table A3: Landed in Canada Refugees – Economic Indicators (2 Years after Landing)

| Land Year	Tax Year	Incidence of Social Assistance (%)	Incidence of Employment Earnings (%)	Average Employment Earnings ($2009)
1993	1995	53	49	16,616
1994	1996	46	53	17,263
1995	1997	43	56	18,192
1996	1998	41	55	18,213
1997	1999	39	58	18,145
1998	2000	36	61	19,127
1999	2001	35	62	19,002
2000	2002	33	61	19,202
2001	2003	30	62	18,890
2002	2004	27	64	19,590
2003	2005	26	66	20,519
2004	2006	23	68	20,640
2005	2007	21	67	21,706
2006	2008	23	65	21,496
2007	2009	26	63	21,286

Graphic A2: Landed in Canada Refugees – Landings by Age Group (% of Total LCRs)

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
Graphic A3: Landed in Canada Refugees – Landings by Gender (% of Total LCRs)

Graphic A4: Landed in Canada Refugees (20 years of age and over) – Landings by Educational Attainment (% of Total LCRs)

Graphic A5: Landed in Canada Refugees – Landings by Official Language Ability (% of Total LCRs)


Graphic A6: Incidence of Social Assistance 2 Years After Landing (%) – LCRs by Country of Birth and Tax Year*


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
Graphic A7: Incidence of Employment Earnings 2 Years After Landing (%) – LCRs by Country of Birth and Tax Year*

Graphic A8: Average Employment Earnings 2 Years After Landing ($2009) – LCRs by Country of Birth and Tax Year*

Graphic A9: Average Employment Earnings ($2009) – LCRs by Years since Landing (YSL) and Landing Cohort

"YSL" – Years since Landing

"*" – Due to the limited number of observations in the IMDB for LCRs, data quality is an issue for some countries of birth. This may result in large fluctuations in the observed trends due to small numbers of observations.

Pages 160 to / à 202

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69(1)(e)

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